

Deconstructing Postmodern Xenophilia

Algirdas Degutis

In a wide-ranging review of Stephen R. C. Hicks's book *Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault* (2004), Max Hocutt (2006) accepts Hicks's hypothesis that postmodernism is a product of the leftists' frustration with the theoretical and practical defeat of their collectivist dream. Yet one may feel some uneasiness with this explanation, if only because postmodernists do not seem to be the defensive party; they rather seem to be the aggressive one. And this means that they might be drawing their inspiration from ideas and sentiments more widely shared than leftism.

The Soviet empire has collapsed, communism in Eastern Europe dismantled, and the communist ideology seems bankrupt. And yet here in Eastern Europe, we are ever more surrounded by the rhetoric of the evils of capitalism and the savagery of unbridled markets. The rhetoric is coming from the West, updated with such buzzwords as "exclusion" and "inclusion," "marginalization" and "empowerment." The drive behind the rhetoric is the idea that social practices which leave some people "behind" or otherwise "exclude" them are unacceptable and should be stopped. There is an ideology behind the drive that might be dubbed as progressive or sentimental liberalism. It is the ideology of those who see bourgeois societies as unjust and mired in all kinds of prejudices and stereotypes. They want our societies to be more tolerant, more caring and more inclusive. Their compassionate efforts are now directed not only at the traditional targets such as the poor and the sick, but also at children, old people, women, sexual and racial minorities, illegal aliens, exotic cultures, rare animal species, depleting rain forests—an infinite series of both

human and non-human beings. All of them are accorded the status of the “downtrodden and oppressed,” the “weak and voiceless,” a status that allows them to demand remedies from the powerful and guilty ones. “Compassion” is the battle cry in contemporary Western politics. The compassionate agenda has taken hold of the moral heights and it rules without any serious contenders.

It is argued below that despite its popularity the agenda is counterproductive, its “progressive” goals are essentially retrogressive, and its implementation would result in the destruction of the West.

It might seem that the compassionate agenda is no novelty, that Christians have practiced it for centuries. The crucial difference is that compassion has sense only in the sphere of voluntary relations: the problem of the Good Samaritan can only be solved by individuals’ free choice. The secular altruism of the progressives, by contrast, appeals to the coercive power of the state and it wants its goals achieved with Caesar’s help. Besides, Christian altruism is restricted in the sense that the Christian altruist is caring primarily for his own community and is caring for others only by simultaneously spreading the Christian values. Secular altruism, by contrast, is open and limitless, subsuming under its cover all the wretched of the earth. It was because of its influence that Christianity itself was not included in the list of EU values. Why? Because doing so would demonstrate Europe’s lack of openness and sensitivity to other religions. However, openness and sensitivity are the cardinal virtues for the contemporary liberal. In his view, all religions and all Gods are equal. The commandment “Do not have any other gods before Me” is too categorical for him. Because of his concern for other religions, he is ready to give up his own. To borrow T. S. Eliot’s phrase, he is a “hollow man.” His world of values is flat, it has no depth: in this world all people are worthy of equal respect, all beliefs are equally worthy of attention, all ways of life are equally welcome, all cultures are equally valuable and a barbarian is the man “who believes in barbarism in the first place” (Finkelkraut 1995, 58). He is open to everything and “has no enemy other than the man who is not open to everything” (Bloom 1987, 27). He conceives his mission as a struggle against intolerance and discrimination, inequality and hierarchy, xenophobia and exclusion. Since a free society spontaneously evolves all kinds of boundaries, exclusions and hierarchies, he is always

hectically busy. He tries to enrich the poor at the expense of the rich; to equalize men's and women's opportunities; to confer on children the right to criticize their parents; to introduce race quotas at the universities; to desegregate the schools; to ban discrimination against homosexuals in the labor market; to protect the foxes from blood-thirsty hunters, etc., etc. In short, he wants to make the world flat: to put down all natural boundaries, destroy all hierarchies, traditional mores, ties of loyalty, cultural and ethnic particularity, even national sovereignty. In this he takes the stance of "aggressive tolerance" towards the dominant ethnicity, culture, tradition, morals and customs—demanding their openness to the outsiders. He wants the entire world to begin anew at the starting line of equal opportunities. Fearful of the unequal results at the finishing line he must vigilantly watch social developments and be ready to take measures against the re-creation of inequalities and the emergence of new forms of exclusion and discrimination. In short, he is full of political energy and is truly an agent of the "permanent revolution." He is the driving impetus behind the progressive movements of social justice, multiculturalism, feminism, anti-racism, anti-colonialism and environmentalism.

In these times, he is faddishly postmodern: proclaiming the equivalence of all beliefs and values, while at the same time denying the legitimacy of the beliefs and values dominant in the West—because they are dominant. Postmodernists are aptly described by the phrase "philosophers of suspicion," which Paul Ricoeur used with respect to Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. They share the conviction that anything said or done in Western societies is mere window-dressing, a camouflage hiding something wrongful or shameful. Wherever they direct their critical gaze they see domination, oppression and fraud. The social world for them is an arena of incessant struggle in which they see only the winners and the losers, the oppressors and the oppressed, the manipulators and the manipulated—even when facing apparently voluntary relations.

The archetype of this posturing is Marx's theory of class antagonism treating the whole history of mankind as the struggle between the exploiters and the exploited. In this struggle all claims to truth or justice, if put forward by bourgeois "reactionaries," are mere ploys of the powerful. "Dominant ideas in any society are always the ideas of

the ruling class” is the relativist thesis of *The Communist Manifesto*. Truth and justice can only be accessible to an agent whose exceptional position allows the transcendence of the struggle. This is the position accorded to the proletariat, the “universal class” of those who have nothing to lose but their chains. By a revolutionary uprising, the proletariat does not merely gain its own freedom, but emancipates humanity from the curse of class antagonism. The revolutionary violence as envisaged by Marx is conceived as a retribution, as a response of the oppressed to hidden (“structural”) coercion. Although bourgeois societies would not allow open coercion and their citizens are formally free, the facade is fraudulent, since it masks the “exploitation of labor.” The wage earners, even if voluntarily joining the labor market, are in reality victims of coercion, for the capitalists only pay them the costs of reproducing their labor power and appropriate the rest of the value created. The system of wage labor is a subtle form of slavery and should be abolished. Only by destroying the system—by abolishing the private ownership of the means of production—can the international proletariat lead humanity to the “realm of freedom.”

As the proletariat failed to live up to expectations in the West, “progressive” thinkers began looking for other agents of emancipation, investing their hopes in the “liberation” movements of women, racial minorities, student rebels (“flower-children”), homosexuals, and environmentalists, to name but a few. The Marxian proletariat was repeatedly replaced with other agents of change in the hope that one or another would finally achieve a radical social transformation. After the breakdown of the Marxist theory of “labor exploitation,” attempts at finding faults with capitalism continued unabated. The forms of capitalist oppression allegedly discovered by the critics came to be ever more refined. One can mention Gramsci’s theories of hegemony that saw bourgeois oppression buttressed by Christianity and traditional culture and the Frankfurt school’s attempt to graft Freud onto Marxism and to trace the oppressive nature of the bourgeois order to the institution of the family and “sexual repression.”

Probably the farthest advances in this direction were made by the classics of postmodernism. In his studies of the history of discipline in prisons and madhouses, Michel Foucault stressed the power of the guards and the experts in shaping inmates’ behavior and eliminating

deviancy. The distinction between the norm and deviancy has, according to Foucault, no natural or objective basis; the “experts” impose it. The knowledge the experts boast of is thus mere imposition of their will constituting an act of violence. By drawing analogies between the prison and other social institutions, Foucault insinuates that bourgeois society as a whole is but a huge prison (or a madhouse). The normal bourgeois is a “normalized” creature. The history of modernity (coterminous with the emergence of bourgeois societies) is a history of subtle subjugation. The older regimes of brutal violence and public executions have been gradually replaced by the more refined, yet more efficient “discursive regime” of the knowledge/power tandem. The regime subjugates and “normalizes” the individual much more effectively than primordial despotism.

Roger Bacon’s aphorism “knowledge is power” was an expression of early modern belief that knowledge was liberating, as it provided the means of subjecting the stingy nature to mankind’s needs. Foucault reversed its meaning: knowledge brings subjugation, suppression, powerlessness and injustice: “all knowledge rests upon injustice . . . the instinct for knowledge is malicious (something murderous, opposed to the happiness of mankind)” (Foucault 1984, 95). Reason, knowledge and truth are mere artifices of a repressive “discursive regime.” The aura of truth that surrounds the various forms of hegemony is a mirage, and reason itself is but an expression of hegemony. What is needed is liberation from reason itself, and its agent can only be the antithesis of the normalized bourgeois—a madman, a deviant, a criminal.

Jacques Derrida holds a similar position. By applying the method of “deconstruction,” he attempts to discredit thought and reason as products of the male arrogance of the West having no objective basis in reality. The Western, “(phallo)logocentric” categories of thought are products of arbitrary acts of dichotomizing and hierarchicalizing; they constitute a hierarchical system with “identity” given priority over “otherness,” with the “Other” pushed to the margins. Logocentric thought is thus a species of coercion and oppression. Deconstruction is emancipation, for it lays bare all those evasions that have been used to marginalize the “Other.” Derrida is also intent on liberating the social “Other”—the ostracized, the vagrant, and the alien. They are to be empowered and brought back from the margins

of society closer to the core.

Now, consider what these endeavors at demarginalization really mean. Since any particular society is constituted precisely by what it excludes and marginalizes, the demands to demarginalize the “Other” of the West are really demands to erase all those boundaries that define the bourgeois order of Western societies. Indeed, all emancipatory doctrines share this underlying intention—to discredit and ultimately to destroy the unjust (exploitative, repressive) order of the West. Paraphrasing Marx, the ultimate intent of all these doctrines is not to explain the world but to change it. Just like their precursor, Marxism, they are not explanatory theories but aggressively practical doctrines. Postmodern criticism “seeks not to find the foundation and the conditions of truth but to exercise power for the purpose of social change” (Lentricchia 1983, 12). Foucault and Derrida both acknowledge the ultimately Marxist, or Marxoid, intention behind their endeavors: “If I had known the Frankfurt School at the right time, I would have spared a lot of work,” writes Foucault. Derrida is explicit: “deconstruction has never had any sense or interest, at least in my eyes, except as a radicalization, which is to say also *in the tradition of a certain Marxism, in a certain spirit of Marxism*” (Derrida 1996, 92).

This Marxoid idea of emancipation is radically different from the idea of individual liberty on which the bourgeois societies were initially built. Such early modern political philosophers as Hobbes and Locke were primarily concerned with the absolute power of the sovereign and set themselves the task of limiting its powers. In their theoretical constructions, individuals’ right of self-defense is merely delegated to the sovereign; his power is limited to the task of making secure an individual’s life, liberty and property. Political power, even if monopolistic, is thus limited—it can only be rightfully used in retaliation to domestic and foreign aggression. The purpose of a political body and the state as its agent is a strictly negative one; specifically, the state bears no responsibility for the citizens’ well being, for their successes or failures in life. This is what the nonpolitical “civil” society is for. Liberty is ultimately freedom from coercion, including coercive intrusions by the state into civil society. All classical liberals have shared this negative conception of freedom with the complementary idea of a “night watchman” state. Emancipatory

doctrines, by contrast, used the concept in a much looser way; for them, freedom ultimately meant freedom from all constraints. In fact, it was transformed into the concept of power (freedom as empowerment) dubbed as “positive” freedom. On this conception, a free person is not at all free, if, for example, he has no money to buy a loaf of bread. By giving him the money, the state could enhance his freedom. In other words, the state has the potential of becoming an agent of liberation, of taking over the emancipatory role of the proletariat.

The main concern of early “progressives” was the issue of labor exploitation. Today’s progressives are intent on eliminating not only economic “exclusion,” but also any kind of exclusion and discrimination. If earlier they tried to base their demands on some allegedly scientific theories of “exploitation” (the labor theory of value), in these times of postmodern relativism it suffices to appeal to “felt discrimination” in order to start clamoring about “exclusion” and to demand political intervention. In practice, any discontent voiced by a homogeneous group is now accepted as evidence that the group has a grievance worthy of political concern. Any group that succeeds at obtaining the status of “discriminated against” comes to be treated as nearly sacred. It becomes the darling of “political correctness,” so that its critics risk not only indictment for bigotry but also legal sanctions.

The issue of homosexuality is a good illustration. Christians have traditionally condemned homosexuality as a grave sin. However, with homosexuals obtaining the protected status of a discriminated group, such criticism has been outlawed in many Western countries. Nowadays a Christian daring to castigate someone as a sodomite or refusing to employ him risks serious legal consequences. Paradoxically, though inevitably, the policy of gay inclusion turned out to be a policy of Christian exclusion.

The hunt for the facts of “discrimination” and “exclusion” has become a major industry for the social critic. Since, for him, all people are basically equal, any factual inequality is evidence of remediable injustice. He is convinced that no exclusion is ever deserved. The poor, for instance, are excluded from lavish consumption not because of wrong decisions made in the past or simply of bad luck, but because of the capitalist principles of wealth distribution

imposed upon society. Sexual minorities are discriminated against not because most people do not want to deal with them, but because society is dominated by the patriarchal order imposed by heterosexual males. The “Third World” is mired in poverty and disease not because of its barbarian habits, but because of the “trauma of colonialism.” Led by this conviction, he always tries to shift the burden of responsibility of the excluded onto the shoulders of the unexcluded: the rich, the heterosexuals, the whites, the Westerners. Cowered by the dominant ideology of liberal sentimentalism, the latter are often ready to shoulder it.

The emancipatory drive and the political activism inspired by it create a political market of altruistic caring. In this market, sentimental activists and cynical political entrepreneurs (“limousine liberals”) compete for victims of “discrimination” and for agendas of social inclusion. These social critics and activists see the objects of their concern as victims of the “system” they themselves inhabit, as abject, powerless and merely receptive beings. This is why their sentimentalism is always accompanied by paternalist arrogance. Paternalism, however, only gives rise to infantilism, for the more the alleged victims are released from the necessity of taking care of themselves, the more childlike and dependent they become. Welfare breeds greater need for welfare. It also creates incentives for the emergence of new claimants for welfare, as new victim groups are elbowing their way—are pushed by the activists—into the public arena with their new “grievances.” All of this is illustrative of Charles Murray’s “law of unintended rewards”: “Any social transfer increases the net value of being in the condition that prompted the transfer” (1984, 212).

As a result of subsidizing individuals because they are poor, there will be more poverty; subsidizing people because they are unemployed will create more unemployment; supporting single mothers will lead to an increase in single motherhood. In short, social welfare programs are ultimately counterproductive. Paradoxically, though again inevitably, the only winners in the game are political entrepreneurs. They need the victims of “the system,” for only by attending to their alleged grievances they gain or keep their own elevated moral grounds. They need to have a constant or even growing supply of them in order to use them as moral shields in the struggle for political influence and power. As Bernard de Jouvenel noticed long ago:

“redistribution is in effect far less a redistribution of free income from the richer to the poorer, as we imagined, than a redistribution of power from the individual to the State” (1952, 179). The failure of their social programs makes no impression on them, for they are in command of the moral high ground as the “caring” and the “compassionate” ones. They are moral narcissists basking in their own good intentions.

John Rawls is an exemplary contemporary liberal. Assuming the basic equality of people, he considers any factual inequality as morally arbitrary. Postulating equal distribution of goods as the base line, he proposes the “difference principle” for dealing with factual inequality. According to the principle, social and economic inequality should be “regulated” so that it would serve the worst off. The principle is said to be an expression of “an undertaking to regard the distribution of natural abilities as a collective asset so that the more fortunate are to benefit only in ways that help those who have lost out” (Rawls 1971, 179).

In other words, inequality can only be justified if it leads to lesser inequality. How far should the regulation go? Since after any act of regulation there would emerge another group of the worst off, the process should continue as long as there is no worst off group, that is, when all and everyone is equally well-off. The end-result is the situation of social and economic equality. The problem is that the result can only be achieved by dumping property rights, that is, by destroying the basis of a free society. Marxism offered a short cut for this overdrawn procedure by proposing a revolutionary upheaval; Rawls prefers a step-by-step procedure to the same destination. So, indeed, “liberals have no enemies to the left” (James Burnham).

Rawls is primarily concerned with economic inequality. However, the emancipatory agenda is now set on abolishing all inequality, ending all exclusion and discrimination. “Discrimination” has become a label to condemn and stigmatize as wrong any social situation where people express their diverse preferences for association with other people. But what is wrong with discrimination? Discrimination is a basic fact of life: everyone is constantly discriminating by choosing friends, spouses, business companions, employees, restaurants, clubs, churches. Discrimination in this sense is a basic liberty enjoyed by individuals in free societies. “Discrimination” in

the pejorative sense is primarily applied to public officials (e.g., judges) if their decisions are perceived as biased and unfair, for in contrast to the private person an official is under an obligation not to follow personal preferences. However, in contemporary usage this pejorative meaning has been turned on its head: now a *private* person can be accused of discrimination if he refuses to rent an apartment to a Muslim or would not hire a self-declared homosexual. Freedom of association is thus under a massive attack. On the one hand, the policy of “anti-discrimination” is intent on *compulsory integration*, erasing the boundaries that spontaneously evolve in people’s private relations. On the other hand, with the prevailing cult of “multiculturalism” and the postmodern idea of the equivalence of all cultures, many Western countries promote nonassimilation or *compulsory segregation* of ethnic, cultural or religious minorities. By urging and implementing compulsory integration (and segregation), sentimental liberalism is attacking property rights, freedom of association and the spontaneous order that evolves on their basis. As Paul Gottfried laments, this is “current liberalism’s assault on what the old liberals called civil society” (1998, 25).

One should again notice the paradox: the policy of fighting discrimination requires official discrimination. For instance, affirmative action directed at blacks in America is simply inverted race discrimination or racism against whites. One should also notice that private discrimination does not lead to the systemic consequences of anti-discrimination policies undertaken by the state. A private person discriminating against another person bears the costs of the practice: e.g., an employer refusing to hire an able man only because of his race faces the risk of losing him to a competitor who is not so prejudiced. Private discrimination, if based only on prejudice, is thus always facing private punishment, and so unlikely to become common practice. Even in those cases where it becomes common practice, there is no reason to consider it wrong. Some groups, because of their differences, might simply be unable to integrate even minimally. Naturally, they move apart and separate. No attempt at their compulsory integration can do away with the differences—most probably it can only inflame them. Similarly, compulsory segregation, by putting the brakes on natural processes of assimilation, creates within free societies islands of potentially hostile aliens. “Anti-discrimination”

policies thus develop a self-destructive logic: the policy of “inclusion” of those who have been excluded at the level of private relations can only exacerbate those features of the excluded that have been the reason for their exclusion in the first place.

John Rawls argues that the factual distribution of goods is morally arbitrary and should be rectified. And what about the *negative* goods, the bads? Should they likewise be redistributed? If unequal distribution of goods is morally arbitrary, can it be that unequal distribution of bads (e.g., responsibility for crimes) is not just as arbitrary? The default position for a liberal is to consider it just as arbitrary and to call for the redistribution of bads. One strategy for doing this is appealing to the “root causes” of bad behavior. The idea is that the offender cannot be guilty all on his own; his misdeeds should rather be explained as an expression of some grievance, as a result of social exclusion. Society’s response should be to do something about the grievance and the exclusion. Responsibility for bad behavior is thus taken off the shoulders of the offender, shifted to wider social surroundings and ultimately dumped on the rest of the society (including the victims of the crime). On this view, the more brutal the expression of the grievance, the more heinous the crime, the more it is indicative of the perpetrator’s social exclusion and the more society (“the system”) is to be blamed for such behavior. Traditional punishment, on the liberal view, is no solution, as it does not deal with the “root causes” of the problem; i.e., discrimination and social injustice. It is the system that must be changed, not the wrongdoer. The society has to be more sensitive to the excluded, the marginalized, the alienated, the desperate and the depressed. In the liberal’s worldview, the wrongdoer is really a victim, one that “is ‘trapped’ by social and economic forces . . . the problem is in the society, not in the people innocently ‘trapped’” (Lakoff 1996, 203).

Again, paradoxically but inevitably, all attempts at dealing with the problem of crime by looking for “root causes” only exacerbate the problem and encourage crime. Why so? Consider the matter from the point of view of the offender. The soft-pedaling policy of looking for “root causes” only confirms to him the reality of his grievances and provides him with reasons to continue the practice. Faced with the liberal response, the offender draws two conclusions: first, that he is in the right, while the indulgent party (part of the “the system”)

is in the wrong (and should feel guilty); second, that he can gain even more (be offered more “sensitivity” and “care”) by perpetrating even more outrageous misdeeds. Offensive behavior and indulgent response create a symbiotic combination of rage and guilt feeding on each other: the offending party becomes ever more brazen, while the soft-pedaling party ever more guilt-ridden. The rhetoric employed by the liberal morally disarms him against any rampaging thug. Since offensive behavior, for the liberal, is evidence of his own failed emancipatory endeavors, he should feel most guilty when the offender does his worst and kills him.

The emancipatory theme is also pursued by Derrida, particularly in his later writings. Derrida is fascinating in that he purifies the moral intention behind the political endeavors of postmodern sentimental liberals. Deconstruction is a method for clearing away artificial social structures created by marginalizing the “Other.” Deconstruction is not mere destruction; rather it is a positive endeavor at making us open to the excluded Other. A deconstructionist implements or restores justice: “Deconstruction is justice. . . . I know nothing more just than what I call deconstruction” (Derrida 1992, 21). Justice is openness to the Other. Which Other? One’s parents, children, spouse, friends, compatriots? It is cheap to be open to those you love or respect. True openness, the morally valuable openness can only be pure and infinite hospitality offered “to someone who is neither expected nor invited. To whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other” (Derrida 1999, 128–29). Derrida is here urging what can be dubbed *xenophilia*—our openness to, and embrace of, those who are the most marginalized, the most alien. He formulates—radically and rigorously—the intention behind all emancipatory doctrines. All of them are intent on achieving “social justice,” or in Derrida’s terms, “infinite justice”—an ideal situation where nobody has any grievances, and everybody is included in one great family of the whole of humanity. How should one proceed with its realization? Rawls suggests that we should start with improving the situation of the worst off in our societies. Derrida urges hospitality to the most alien.

Stephen Hicks calls postmodernism *reverse Thrasymacheanism*, alluding to the sophist Thrasymachus of Plato’s *Republic*. Thrasy-

machus marshaled relativistic arguments in support of the claim that justice is the interest of the stronger. Postmodernists, according to Hicks, simply reverse the claim, for they are on the side of the weaker and the oppressed groups: justice is the interest of the weaker (2004, 182).

Derrida carries the idea of “reverse Thrasymacheanism” one step farther, to its logical consummation in xenophilia. For in Rawls’s conception, the weak still belong to “our society,” to “us,” and thus an element of egoism and exclusion still remains. Derrida takes the final step by abolishing that element. The morally most valuable inclusion is hospitality to the absolutely foreign, to the wholly Other, thus ultimately and logically—to the deadly enemy.

These are the times when we have a nearly ideal case for testing the consequences of liberal xenophilia. Challenged by Islamic resurgence, contemporary liberalism meets its nemesis. Islam is a totalitarian religion set on converting or conquering non-Muslims, while contemporary liberalism is an ideology set on renouncing Western exceptionalism and embracing the radically alien. The two intentions are perfectly complementary: absolute intolerance meets suicidal hospitality. In Western Europe, which has already defined itself as mere openness (as a gap or a hole), with the growing aggressiveness of Muslims, Europeans will try ever more hard to integrate them and will feel ever more guilty for failing. Unless it renounces the ideology of xenophilia, the West will go down even without a bang, whimpering guiltily.

References

- Bloom, Allan. 1987. *The Closing of the American Mind*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Derrida, Jacques. 1992. The force of law. In *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, edited by D. Cornell, et al.. London: Routledge, 3–68.
- _____. 1996. *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*. Translated by P. Kamuf. New York: Verso.
- _____. 1999. *Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Finkielkraut, Alain. 1995. *The Defeat of the Mind*. Translated by J. Friedlander. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 1984. Nietzsche, genealogy, and history. *The Foucault Reader*. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: Penguin Books.
- Gottfried, Paul. 1998. *After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hicks, Stephen R. C. 2004. *Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from*

- Rousseau to Foucault*. Tempe, Arizona: Scholargy Publications.
- Hocutt, Max. 2006. Hicks versus postmodernism. *The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies* 7, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 445–56.
- Jouvenel, Bernard de. 1952. *The Ethics of Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lakoff, George. 1996. *Moral Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lentricchia, Frank. 1983. *Criticism and Social Change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.