Embracing Power Roles Naturally: Rand's Nietzschean Heroes and Villains

Robert Powell

In her novel *The Fountainhead* (1943), Ayn Rand's true Nietzschean Superman hero should be Gail Wynand and Dominique should be the true villain because both naturally accept and enjoy their aspirations of power. Each expresses his or her own form of power: Wynand enjoys money and Dominique enjoys her femme fatale allurement. Rand clouds this same aspiration in Roark by having him forcefully take power. She places problematic moral labels on both Roark and Toohey.

Rand never truly breaks from Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy of the Superman in her fiction. Ronald E. Merrill (1991) argues, "*The Fountainhead* is Rand's explicit and final renunciation of the morality of Nietzsche (47). . . . Roark's courtroom speech at the novel's climax decisively cuts her ties with Nietzsche" (55). M. Stanton Evans (1967) claims further: "The resemblances [of Rand] to Nietzsche are unmistakable, but they end precisely where the will to power begins" (1060).

However, as if in disagreement with these two scholars, Roark demonstrates a Nietzschean will to power just like that of Wynand. Rand's moral label of good placed on Roark's character clouds this will and his natural acceptance of it. This paper argues that Roark is not an honest character—Wynand is. Roark denies a will to power in his words but accepts it in his actions. Roark says, "I don't propose to force or be forced" (Rand 1943, 26). According to Stephen Cox (1998), Rand's Nietzschean conceptions about power and freedom were clearly related to her literary desire for intense characterizations. Thinking of the character that Roark needed to be, Rand wrote in

The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 10, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 371–98.

1936: "He has a tremendous, unshatterable conviction that he can and will force men to accept him, not beg and cheat them into it. He will take the place he wants, not receive it from others."[1]

For example, in the novel, Roark's architecture job with John Erik Snyte was "less than he wanted and more than he could expect" (Rand 1943, 104) and "[t]he employees had been trained not to intrude on the occasions when Snyte brought a client into the drafting room" (126). Roark intrudes on the client's drawing and takes his rightful place of having the job of John Erik Snyte's client all to himself. "He seized the sketch, his hand flashed forward and a pencil ripped across the drawing. Snyte felt free to whirl on Roark and scream: 'You're fired, God damn you! Get out of here! You're fired!'"(127). This is a will to power in the Nietzschean tradition that Rand disguises in Roark's character.

Furthermore, Wynand is portrayed as a failure for being the second most powerful man in New York at novel's end. Rand's novels are sweepstakes for thrones of greatness and second best is the first loser. However, Wynand is no more power-seeking than Roark. As a capitalist hero, wealth is Wynand's power more than ruling. The power created by his wealth is the only thing that keeps Toohey from taking over his paper. "Wynand looked at his wrist watch. He said, 'It's nine o'clock. You're out of a job, Mr. Toohey. *The Banner* has ceased to exist. . . . Yes, you had worked here for thirteen years . . . Yes, I bought them all out [the stockholders of *The Banner*], Mitchell Layton included, two weeks ago'" (690).

If Roark is not seeking power, why is he willing to rape Dominique, bomb Cortlandt and do Peter's work for him? These are all acts of taking his rightful place among his peers in order to move up to a higher position of greatness above the masses. Thus, he is not seeking the power of wealth, like Wynand has achieved, but a power similar to that of Henry Cameron: "He [Henry Cameron] chose what he wished to build. When he built, a client kept his mouth shut. He demanded of all people the one thing he had never granted anybody: obedience. . . . People called him crazy. But they took what he gave them, whether they understood it or not, because it was a building 'by Henry Cameron'" (44).

On the way to the top, Roark's will to power is more forced and repressive of the natural existence of being than Wynand's. Rand

makes Roark look like a saint who cares mostly about the integrity of his soul. Roark's fight is one for power—not integrity. Wynand admits and accepts this will to power—Roark doesn't. Walter Kaufmann (1959) argues, "The will to power is, according to Nietzsche, a universal drive, found in all men. . . . He does not endorse the will to power any more than Freud endorses sexual desire; but he thinks we shall be better off if we face the facts and understand ourselves than if we condemn others hypocritically, without understanding" (199). Roark's character tries to reject this natural will to power and he condemns Wynand for it. "He [Roark] thought: I haven't mentioned to him [Wynand] the worst second-hander of all—the man who goes after power" (Rand 1943, 609).

Roark seeks power because he can only give orders—not take them. He wants obedience from others but can't offer it to anyone else. He loses two jobs for refusing to take orders from superiors. He abuses his own power whether he has earned it or not.[2] Wynand knows when to receive and give orders. Unlike Roark, on the road to success, as needed, he naturally accepts his roles of either superiority or subordination. "Next morning, he [Wynand] walked into the office of the editor of the Gazette . . . and asked for a job in the city room. . . . 'We have no jobs here,' said the editor. 'I'll hang around,' said Wynand. 'Use me when you want to. You don't have to pay me. You'll put me on salary when you'll feel you'd better'" (406).

No matter how much Roark represses the natural will to power, it continues to come out in his character. However, Roark's integrity is based more on humanism than rationality.[3] Despite Rand's noble attempt, Roark's false sense of integrity destroys this so-called break with Nietzsche. In *The Fountainhead*, Rand just waters it down in Roark with a moral label.

According to Whittaker Chambers (1957, 595), Rand is more heavily indebted to Nietzsche than Aristotle. Gene Bell-Villada (2004, 236) claims, "The Ueberfrau [Rand] never owned up to her debt to Nietzsche, and she publicly repudiated his anti-rationalist and relativist tendencies." Robert Sheaffer (1999, 313–14) confirms this point by saying:

> Nietzsche is the one philosopher whose style and tone almost perfectly match Rand's. Both bitterly denounce altruism,

> pity, and Christianity. Both ceaselessly emphasize self-reliance, and express scorn for those who fail to meet their high standards. . . . More than seventy-five years before Rand shocked a generation by proclaiming selfishness a virtue, Nietzsche's Zarathustra praised "glorified selfishness, the sound, healthy selfishness, that issues from a mighty soul" (Nietzsche [1883] 1969, Bk. III, chap. 54, 208). Indeed, Nietzsche even poses the question "Who is Zarathustra?"(Book. IV, sec.11) in virtually the same manner as does Rand in *Atlas Shrugged*: "Who is John Galt?" He is the Overman, the son of Zarathustra.

Roark is a lighter version of this. He's more morally good than Wynand. However, this doesn't necessarily make him a better hero based on the standards of either Rand's Objectivism or Nietzsche's Superman. Wynand is the only character in *The Fountainhead* who meets the criteria of both the Nietzschean Superman and Randian hero. In the key tenets of Rand's philosophy, she states:

> Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man's life. . . . Reason is the source, the precondition of his productive work—pride is the result. . . . The basic social principle of the Objectivist ethics is that just as life is an end in itself, so every living human being is an end in himself. To live for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself. To live for his own sake means that the achievement of his own happiness is man's highest moral purpose.[4] (1964, 25, 27)

Wynand follows all these rules in the Nietzschean tradition—he's happy and lives for himself.

Rand simply makes Wynand's crushing of the weak look like he is "letting others live for him." For example, when he offers Peter Keating the Stoneridge commission for his wife, Dominique, he says, "I'm breaking all the rules of charity. It's extremely cruel to be honest. . . . Just say that you don't want any of it. I won't mind. There's Mr. Ralston Holcombe across the room. He can build Stoneridge as well as you could" (Rand 1943, 441–42). In this case,

Wynand is exposing and crushing Keating's weakness. Just like the readers of *The Banner*, Keating is not being ruled by Wynand; he is free to accept the 'happiness' offered by the Nietzschean hero or not.

Leslie Thiele (1990) interprets, "For Nietzsche struggle is the essence of the heroic. . . . He desires his friend to be his fiercest opponent. He bears a spiritualized enmity toward himself, a soul rich in contradictions that does not relax, does not long for peace"(12).[5] Wynand just *appears* to be a more evil version of Roark. In his novel, *The Story of Sergei Petrovich* (1900), Leonid Andreev creates similar types of good and evil Nietzschean heroes, between whom there is a fine moral line, just like Rand:

> Two Nietzschean characters appear in *The Story of Sergei Petrovich*: Sergei Petrovich's best friend, Novikov, and Sergei Petrovich himself. Novikov, who introduces Sergei Petrovich to Nietzsche's philosophy, is a copy of [a] vulgar Nietzschean antihero.
>
> He is inconsiderate, arrogant, and often cruel. He disdains the people closest to him, especially Sergei Petrovich. When Sergei Petrovich, inspired by a vision of the superman, wants to transform his own character, Novikov scoffs at the irony of Sergei Petrovich's infatuation with Nietzsche. Nietzsche, he says, "who so loved the strong, has become the teacher of the weak and the poor in spirit." (Clowes 1986, 321)

In this tradition, Rand succeeds in Roark's creation by making him strong and great but she fails by making him humanistic and kind in helping the weak. In terms of Nietzschean morality, Roark is more between good and evil than Wynand. A more rational Nietzschean Superman route for Roark would have been to expose Keating's weakness by crushing him competitively through his own effort.[6] Instead, Roark uses his friendship to gain commissions and falsely portray Keating as a better architect than he really is. Helping the weak to look strong is not a good code by either Nietzschean or Randian standards.

Rand's break with Nietzsche in the novel is not clean. Roark is torn between the strength of greatness and the weakness of human-

ism. He fails to show the proper disdain for weakness, in the form of Keating, which Kira shows in *We the Living*:

> "Can you sacrifice the few? When those few are the best? Deny the best its right to the top—and you have no best left. What are your masses but millions of dull, shriveled, stagnant souls that have no thoughts of their own, no dreams of their own, no will of their own, who eat and sleep and chew helplessly the words others put into their brains?
>
> "And for those you would sacrifice the few who know life, who are life? I loathe your ideals because I know no worse injustice than the giving of the undeserved. Because men are not equal in ability and one can't treat them as if they were. And because I loathe most of them." (Rand 1959, 71–72)

Whereas Roark loses much of this hatred for the weak in *The Fountainhead*, Rand rejoins and renews it in her Nietzschean heroes more fully in *Atlas Shrugged*. Hank Rearden's weak brother, Phillip, says to him:

> "Don't try to buy me off with cash! I want a job!"
>
> "Pull yourself together, you poor louse. Do you hear what you are saying?" . . .
>
> "I only—"
>
> "To buy you off? Why should I try to buy you off—instead of kicking you out, as I should have, years ago?" . . . "Phillip . . . get out of here. . . . And don't ever try to enter these mills again, because there will be orders at every gate to throw you out, if you try it." (Rand 1957, 863–65)

When Rearden takes his rightful place among the Nietzschean Supermen in Galt's Gulch, he has done away with the weaknesses of pity, guilt and self-sacrifice.

Unlike Roark, Wynand naturally accepts his flaws and imperfec-

tions in the Nietzschean tradition. Thiele (1990) asserts, "By heroic standards everything that contributes to strength is good" (24). "And is it not Nietzsche's claim only that . . . morality was the creation of the inferior and the weak?" (Bergmann 1988, 31). In terms of Nietzschean morality, strength is good and weakness is evil. "Only the strong, those capable of creating their own values, survive. . . . Man, like all forms of life, is in a constant state of becoming. There is no stability, only ascent or decline" (Thiele 1990, 85, 91). Roark is not weak. Nevertheless, his refusal to accept the natural imperfections of himself is a movement more towards weakness rather than strength.

Being a perfect "end in himself" according to Rand's philosophy, makes him unrealistic and an improper vulgarization of the Nietzschean Superman. Roark portrays the idea that one must be a perfectly great Superman before true inner searching can begin. In terms of Nietzschean characters, like Theodore Dreiser's Cowperwood, in relation to Rand's heroes, Wynand is the most realistic, who, unlike Roark, admits that he's not perfect:

> The kind of hero in whom Aristotle [in Rand's artistic interpretation of his ideas] is most interested is hardly an example of perfection and success: He is a tragic hero, an essentially good man—"or one better rather than worse"—who nevertheless suffers as the result of some "flaw." This is a kind of character that is common enough in life. Yet it is a kind that is conspicuously excluded by Rand's moral theory of art—with peculiar effects on the picture of life in her novels. Many of Rand's most interesting characters have the makings of tragic heroes, yet their tragic possibilities seem almost to embarrass her. Only Gail Wynand, in *The Fountainhead*, is allowed to develop the complex role of a good man who falls by his own error. (Cox 1986, 20)

Wynand admits that he's selfish and greedy for wealth and power. Unlike Roark in the novel, he values strength above morality and accepts his imperfect existence. Nevertheless, he strives for perfection and crushes the weak, not on whims, but out of a hatred for weakness and pity.

Roark and Dominique look like Sergei Petrovich and Werther of Johann Goethe's novel *The Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774). Neither one can accept his or her greatness within a naturally imperfect existence. Each has to be "all or nothing." Roark will unnaturally "take" his place as the greatest and most powerful man in New York. He uses some friendships and political connections to gain success. Furthermore, he helps the weak on his way to the top instead of crushing them.

One mystery of characterization in *The Fountainhead*, according to Douglas Den Uyl (1999, 60), "is Roark's willingness to do Keating's work despite his fierce belief in individualism." When Keating offers Roark a check for designing the Cosmo-Slotnick building for him, Roark says, "'And here's my bribe to you, Peter. . . . To keep your mouth shut . . . when I'll have money, I'd like to ask you please not to blackmail me. I'm telling you frankly that you could. Because I don't want anyone to know that I had anything to do with that building'" (Rand 1943, 193–94).

On his way to the top, Wynand never makes secret deals like this one. Thus, Wynand is more honestly swift than Roark. Where Roark earns his position mostly through his greatness and abilities, Wynand earns his power totally through them. "At the end of the week, in a rush hour, a man from the city room called Wynand to run an errand. Other small chores followed. He obeyed with military precision. In ten days he was on salary. In six months he was a reporter. In two years he was an associate editor" (406).

Chris Matthew Sciabarra (1995, 401 n.36) argues, "Wynand, of course, is not a villain in *The Fountainhead*, but he is the embodiment of all that Rand believed was wrong with the Nietzschean ethos." Rand's philosophy never accepts the natural existence and Roark is portrayed as a man whose rational mind is above nature. However, his false sense of integrity corrupts her attempt at this break with Nietzschean philosophy. If Roark's integrity was as true as he pretends, he would represent, for Rand, a cleaner separation from this. Roark designs both his own buildings and those for which Keating takes credit. Integrity, a form of morality, real or fake, has no true place in Nietzsche's Supermen. Kaufmann (1959) points out:

> What the philosophers called a "rational foundation for

> morality" [similar to what Roark portrays] and tried to supply was, properly considered, only a scholarly variation of a common faith in the prevalent morality; a new means of expression of this faith; in short, itself simply another feature of, or rather another fact within, a particular morality; indeed, in the last analysis, a kind of denial that this morality might ever be considered problematic—certainly the very opposite of an examination, analysis, questioning, and vivisection of this very faith. (192)

Furthermore, Roark's actions of taking his rightful place above the masses look more like those based on will instead of reason. He gains a commission by a split second emotional reaction of changing a drawing in front of Snyte's client.

Likewise, the rape of Dominique is an act of will—not reason. Caroline Picart (1999) categorizes Nietzsche's literary career into three different phases. These are Pre-Zarathustran, Zarathustran and Post-Zarathustran. The most important work of the Pre-Zarathustran period is *The Birth of Tragedy* (5–7, 25). This work depicts two different forms of art, Apollonian and Dionysian. Apollonian art is individual art such as dreams and sculptures, while Dionysian art is communal such as music and intoxication. In relation to *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), Rand and Nietzsche were the Apollonian and Dionysian "odd couple."

The problem with Roark is not that he uses the Nietzschean blend of Apollo and Dionysus on his way to greatness. The problem with Roark is that Rand rejects the Dionysian in him, despite the fact that we can see it in his character. She angrily releases these repressed emotions and struggles to hide them in Roark's character. Robert Sheaffer (1999) concludes:

> Attempting to deny and/or repress the Dionysian, Rand sought to attribute love and sex to Apollo alone. This was a great mistake. If Dominique Francon had understood love to be the highest of rational values, she would have felt no ambivalence about her desire for a man who seemed to meet all her criteria. It would not have been necessary for her to devise a cat-and-mouse game to lure him into her bedroom:

> she could simply have conversed with him about philosophy, and after discovering that they held compatible philosophical premises, they could merrily have hopped into bed. (315)

Even though Rand took an opposing side to Nietzsche and rejected everything natural in both her fiction and nonfiction, she appreciated Nietzsche's symbolism of these two sides of man. "We may accept Nietzsche's symbols, but not his estimate of their respective values, nor the metaphysical necessity of a reason-emotion dichotomy" (Rand [1971] 1999, 100).

Picart (1999) disagrees with Rand's point here by stating that, "The Apollinian and the Dionysian are intertwined in a complex, erotic embrace at the heart of nature and genuine art" (45). These two art forms need each other, yet Nietzsche's love for the Dionysian was one major thing Rand disliked about his philosophy. The problem here is not that Rand uses the Dionysian, but it's that she doesn't "erotically embrace" it. She gives us a mostly Apollonian novel with Dionysus subtly sneaking in through the back door. Rand grudgingly released a repressed, instead of a smoothly flowing, Dionysus to sensationalize her own work. Jeff Walker (1999) argues, "Rand is what a European Nietzschean looks like after transplantation to late 1920s America. . . . Rand wanted to revitalize business values by injecting their seemingly dull Apollonian nature with a shot of Dionysian Nietzsche" (277).

The removal of Roark's guise of moral goodness on the way to greatness would make his rape of Dominique less problematic. Roark's integrity is a form of morality and a battle against the naturalness of himself. As Emile Faguet (1918) writes: "Morality is organized against the force and the beauty of mankind. Of course, it is itself a force, but a weakening and disfiguring force. One must fight morality with all the love one feels and should feel for strength and beauty"(125).

However, Rand's total rejection of the Dionysian is problematic for Roark's character and has no true place in the Nietzschean view of "strength, beauty or greatness."[7] Despite his ambivalence with both forms of art, Nietzsche was more partial to the Dionysian. H.L. Mencken ([1913] 1993, 197–98) would categorize Roark as a Dionysian when he says, "The Dionysian state would see the triumph, not

of drunken loafers, but of the very men whose efforts are making for progress today: those strong, free, self-reliant, resourceful men whose capacities are so much greater than the mobs that they are often able to force their ideas upon it. . . . The strong man . . . would acknowledge no authority but his own will and no morality but his own advantage."

Rand tries to have her cake and eat it too with Roark. She wants to accept the great Nietzschean Superman in Roark, but reject his natural will to power. Greatness is the true measure of the Nietzschean Superman—not moral good. Goodness and greatness are not the same concepts. Rand tries to problematically show, through Roark's character, that the two should be synonymous. According to Frithjof Bergmann (1988, 40), "Nietzsche wanted to abolish the strictly moral, and wanted to put a set of purely natural codes into its place."

Rand's moral label of so-called integrity taints Roark's greatness. Wynand crushes the weak out of a loathing for them. Roark helps the weak. His association with the weak really takes away some of Roark's own greatness. When agreeing to design Cortlandt for Keating, he says, "I'll design Cortlandt. You'll put your name on it (Rand 1943, 581) . . . We're partners now. You have your share to do. It's a legitimate share. This is my idea of cooperation, by the way. You'll handle people. I'll do the building. We'll each do the job we know best, as honestly as we can" (582). The problem is not that Roark does this dishonest act; it is that he claims an idealistic integrity while doing it. Roark needs this help from the weak Keating in order to get the Cortlandt commission—one he would not have been offered otherwise. Thus, he is not as good or great as Rand idealistically portrays him in the novel.

Rand's heroes, Roark included, are not good; they just represent a different and/or lesser form of evil than her villains. With the exception of Roark's fake integrity, her heroes would suit Nietzsche just fine. "Man is evil. . . . For evil is man's best strength. Man must grow better and more evil—thus do I teach. The most evil is necessary for the Superman's best" (Nietzsche 1883, Part IV, 299). Stephen Cox (1998, 57) speaks on this idea when he says, "She [Rand] always hated 'the little street,' the world of petty ideals and petty rules, the world of 'snickering, giggling, dirty-story-telling, good-timing, jolly, regular fellows'." The typical Randian protagonist is above the

petty reasonable and is a rebel anti-hero. However, Rand has trouble admitting that they are all seeking, whether directly or indirectly—more power.

Wynand should be Rand's greatest hero because he is the only one who does not *pretend* that he's not Nietzschean. Rand waters down this Nietzscheanism in all her other heroes. "Other 'good' characters, such as Hank Rearden in *Atlas Shrugged*, are usually maneuvered into mending their potentially fatal flaws" (Cox 1986, 21). All of Rand's heroes seek more money and/or power.

They are all egotistically greedy and proud about it but Wynand is the only character in Rand's novel who bluntly admits it. He says, "The voice of his masses pushed me up and down. Of course, I collected a fortune in the process. . . . Yet people call me corrupt. Why? . . . I wanted power over a collective soul and I got it" (Rand 1943, 605).

All throughout Rand's fiction, we see the *Übermensch* and her idea of selfish excess for the individual going beyond both Christian and social notions of good and evil. Although Nietzsche was blunter than Rand about advocating the use of this type of power, the two philosophers were more similar than different. Merrill (1991, 24) claims that, "He [Nietzsche] like Rand, knew what he was against—socialism and statism—far better than he knew what he was for." Both writers denounced pity and Christianity.

Walker (1999, 275–77) says, "Rand's torchbearers try to minimize Nietzsche's important influence on her. In calling Rand a Nietzschean, she didn't necessarily share all of his views. However, she was a 'vulgar Nietzschean' . . . The theme of the disgustingness of non-heroic average humanity would be a constant in all Rand's novels . . . Objectivism absorbed Nietzsche, vulgarized or otherwise, at its core." Sheaffer (1999, 313) adds, "The specter of Nietzsche has long hovered uninvited over the Randian canon, and at times an exorcism is attempted. However, the Nietzsche-Rand connection is much too powerful to deny."

Just like much of Rand's philosophy is similar to that of Nietzsche, the false sense of integrity is the only trait which separates Roark from Wynand. Despite the fact that they both battle one another professionally, Roark and Wynand are friends. Friends are usually more alike than different and often have much in common. This is

more evidence for the idea that Roark is a Nietzschean Superman just like Wynand. Or, Wynand is pure Nietzschean Superman and Roark is Nietzschean Superman-lite, watered down with integrity for American readers. Dominique voluntarily sacrifices herself to Roark. It doesn't make Roark any less Nietzschean simply because others choose to sacrifice themselves to him. "Roark's friendship for Wynand is not a transitory one that ends in some discovery of what Wynand is like. Roark remains true to Wynand until the end" (Den Uyl 1999, 59).

Just as she does for Roark, Rand puts a problematic moral label on Wynand. She tries to make him look more evil than he really is. Dominique says to Wynand, "That life story of the Bronx housewife who murdered her husband's mistress is pretty sordid, Gail. But I think there's something dirtier—the curiosity of the people who like to read about it" (Rand 1943, 490). Through legal and productive work, Wynand is merely supplying a demand with this story. The "We don't read Wynand" boycott was freedom of choice for the public.

The author tries to make Wynand's paper look unethical because it's against men like Roark. "The *Banner* had destroyed the Stoddard Temple in order to make room for this play . . ." (493). This is Wynand's prerogative because it's his paper. A paper isn't good or bad because of its views; different newspapers cater to different audiences. It's good or bad because of its quality as a product. If the *Banner* was not a good product, Wynand would not be wealthy. Rand tries to make Wynand look unethical for being a capitalist hero and make Roark look good for helping the weak and incompetent. It should be reversed. Wynand is more individualistic than Roark and a true representation of what Rand's heroes should look like.

For Ted Turner and Rupert Murdoch, it doesn't matter whether they believe in what their stations show. As long as they give the public a good quality product, make money and stay within bounds of the law, they can show whatever they want. Wynand does all these things. He created a lucrative and successful paper based on his own individual greatness and ability. It makes Wynand happy to run his paper in his own way—not a way based on traditional codes of social morality. Roark's so-called integrity is not really a good basis for judging Wynand's paper.

Wynand is hard and tough. He says, "It is not my function to help people preserve a self-respect they haven't got. You give them what they profess to like in public. I give them what they really like. Honesty is the best policy, gentlemen, though not quite in the sense you were taught to believe" (410). Honestly, Roark is simply taking a different route to the same destination as Wynand—the throne of Nietzschean greatness and power.

Roark is the most good, Wynand is the most great. Wynand is more powerful than Roark and capable of crushing him. When making Roark the corrupt offer, he says, "It would be easy for me to arrange that no commission be available to you anywhere in this country" (532). However, in the Nietzschean tradition, Wynand wants "greatness in man" to succeed just like Roark does. Thus, Wynand is a Roark with wealth and success. He can relate to Roark's emerging Superman status—because he was once in the same position. Furthermore, because Roark is a disguised version of himself—the great Nietzschean hero, Wynand sees no weakness in him to crush. Roark knows this and relies on the virtues of Wynand's Nietzschean strength, not what he calls "integrity."[8]

Because of this integrity, Roark is more a so-called personification of good than a true model of what Rand's hero should look like. In *Atlas Shrugged*, Francisco d'Anconia, Hank Rearden and Dagny Taggart all create their own forms of morality more in line with the Nietzschean tradition. They all go beyond traditional "good and evil" on their way to crushing the weak. At least Dagny Taggart offers help to Hank Rearden—a strong and great hero like herself. Roark helps the weak, incompetent and parasitical. He dishonestly helps Keating and assists the weak villain, Dominique, in freeing herself from slavery. For this reason, he should not be Rand's greatest hero of the novel.

It's not that these heroes want to crush the weak and rule them; it's more that the weak are restrained by their inability, weak minds, and traditional morality. Therefore, they cannot compete in Rand's Nietzschean power sweepstakes for greatest among the strong. Wynand should be Rand's true hero in *The Fountainhead* because, all throughout his life, he has needed less help than any of the other characters. "He was fifteen when he was found, one morning, in the gutter, a mass of bleeding pulp, both legs broken, beaten by some

drunken longshoreman. . . . He had crawled, able to move nothing but his arms. He had knocked against the bottom of a door. . . . It was the only time in his life that Gail Wynand asked for help" (405).

Nevertheless, after both giving help to and receiving it from Keating, Roark realizes the mistake that should have cost him Rand's power sweepstakes victory. He says, "It's I who've destroyed you, Peter. From the beginning. By helping you. There are matters in which one must not ask for help nor give it. I shouldn't have done your projects at Stanton. I shouldn't have done the Cosmo-Slotnick Building. Nor Cortlandt" (612–13).

Roark stifles individuality and self-reliance in Dominique by helping her in the same way. Roark's help for the weak is Rand's way of clouding and disguising his natural will to power in the Nietzschean tradition. This "integrity" is similar to the morally good trait of "democracy" that can be seen in the Jack London types of Socialist Supermen. In Roark, Rand's so-called break with Nietzsche is one in which her hero is problematically torn between being the Capitalist and Socialist Nietzschean Superman. The problem with her break with Nietzsche in the form of Roark is neither the break nor Roark's sense of integrity.

The main problem is that Roark's integrity is not genuine. Although Roark claims to have integrity, he befriends a man with no integrity of soul, Wynand, and uses his friendship for the lucrative and prestigious commission of the Wynand Building at novel's end. In his hesitation to claim a moral/political side of the Nietzschean Superman, Roark embodies the true hypocrisy within the American Imagination. Wynand is clearly on the side of Capitalist Supermen, just as Jack London's hero in the novel *The Iron Heel* (1908), Ernest Everhard, is clearly on the Socialist side. Roark is torn between both sides. Of this hypocrisy, Geoffrey Harpham (1975, 33) claims, "For, in a sense, superman socialism is merely a caricature of the contradictory aspirations of a democratic society which advocates universal social justice while placing almost no upward bounds on individual self-aggrandizement."

Roark's uncompromising integrity actually stems from remnants of democracy and the altruism that Rand forcefully meant to show him opposing. His humanism and integrity are not true traits of the Nietzschean Superman. He cares more about his so-called moral

integrity than his strength and greatness. His humanistic help for Keating shows that he does not crush the weak out of a hatred for weakness. Just like Ernest Everhard, Roark is a Nietzschean hero still in the developmental stages. Thiele (1990, 43) asserts, "Heroic individualism is not to be equated with what might be called democratic individualism. The latter was considered by Nietzsche at best an undeveloped, preparatory stage for the former."

Roark should not be Rand's true hero because he accepts and rejects selected forms of Nietzschean and traditional morality at his convenience. He should, like Wynand, either fully accept or reject one or the other. He rejects altruism and Christianity in the Nietzschean tradition while accepting humanism. Even Ernest Everhard battles capitalists with Wynand's same Nietzschean desire to crush "the weak." Humanism and the Übermensch don't mix—Roark is Rand's problematic representation of both things. According to Kristin Robinson (1989, 29), "The Randian hero is cooperative and aids others not simply because he or she learned to through socialization but because these characteristics are incorporated into a personal value system, a matter of personal integrity."[9]

The humanism of Roark originates from the fraternal spirit of the French Revolution fictionally portrayed by Victor Hugo in his novel *Les Misérables* (1862). Barbara Branden (1986) states:

> Among Hugo's characters, she [Rand] found her favorite in *Les Misérables*. . . . It was Enjolras, the young leader of the insurrectionists. . . . [Rand says] "All of the other characters, like Jean Valjean and Marius, were presented as average men, however grandly presented. I fell in love with Enjolras. Enjolras the man of exclusive, dedicated purpose, a man heroically dedicated to a one-track-mind purpose." In Enjolras, the austere, implacable rebel—whom Hugo described as "the marble lover of liberty," who "had but one passion, the right; but one thought, to remove all obstacles"—she [Rand] saw the dedicated purposefulness and the love of rectitude that were to form her own concept of human greatness. (25)

Nevertheless, her insightful look at Enjolras, the basic precursor

of all Randian heroes, doesn't mention the humanistic sense of duty within his character. "Enjolras, we know, had something of the Spartan and of the Puritan" (Hugo [1862] 1964, 371). In his speech to the citizens of France, Enjolras comments, "We are the priests of the republic, we are the sacramental host of duty. Each sovereignty gives up a certain portion of itself to form the common right. The common right is nothing more or less than the protection of all radiating upon the right of each. This protection of all over each is called Fraternity" (382; 416–17).

Enjolras' humanism is not a problematic aspect of his heroism. Enjolras' humanism is honest—unlike Roark's. According to Rand:

> It [rationality] means one's acceptance of the responsibility of forming one's own judgments and of living by the work of one's own mind [which is the virtue of independence]. It means that one must never sacrifice one's convictions to the opinions or wishes of others [which is the virtue of integrity] —that one must never attempt to fake reality in any manner. (Rand 1964, 26)

In the case of Enjolras, the fraternal commonwealth of France is a noble cause to humanistically represent and fight to save. In Roark's case, humanistically making the weak [Keating] look strong is working against what Rand calls "independence," "integrity," and it's "faking reality." Roark is letting Keating live off his mind, fulfilling the wishes of Keating [along with himself] and is using his connection with the weak in order to "fake reality." In other words, Roark's collaboration with Keating helps him to obtain some commissions through "dependence" and makes Keating look better than he really is [faking reality]. In *Atlas Shrugged*, no equivalent to Keating exists.

According to Kaufmann (1968, 370), "Hardness against oneself and one's friends is essential for those who would educate and perfect themselves and their friends—but hardness against those who would not be able to stand such treatment is, says Nietzsche, entirely unpardonable: 'When the exceptional human being treats the mediocre more tenderly than himself and his peers, this is not mere courtesy of the heart—it is simply his duty'."[10]

Roark violates this law of true Nietzschean heroism in the form

of duty to oneself *and* others. He says to Keating, "I loaded you with more than you could carry" (Rand 1943, 613).

Wynand follows this law of "duty to *only* oneself." Treating the weak more tenderly than oneself through a sense of duty is not the same as humanistically "giving a portion of oneself for the common right." Treating the weak more tenderly is actually exposing their weakness. Wynand does this by offering cash bribes, or an easy life, in exchange for corruption [admission of weakness]. He does this for himself—to expose and exploit weakness. Roark does this for the good of humanity—to cover up weakness and unrealistically help it rise to greatness with him.

In addition to this, Rand perpetuates the failure of true greatness [Wynand] and success of true weakness [Dominique]. She does this by creating split second emotional changes in these characters in key areas of the novel. These are insincere transformations from the true ideals of these characters based on will instead of Rand's professed reason. "He [Wynand] had been calm while he telephoned . . . and arranged Roark's bail. . . . But when he stood in the warden's office of a small county jail, he began to shake suddenly. 'You bloody fools!' . . . and he couldn't understand . . . why he didn't smash this jail, with his fists or through his papers . . . he had to kill . . . in defense of his life" (620).

Wynand, who refuses to apologize for or change the *Banner* for Dominique, does it for Roark after he's jailed. Throughout two thirds of the novel, Wynand keeps his personal and professional lives strictly separate. He really has nothing to prove to himself or anybody else. He offered his power and wealth to get Roark acquitted. Roark refused it. Why change his paper for Roark when it was built on opposing him?

Rand gives the character who should be the parasitical villain, Dominique, the same split-second self-realization of so-called goodness. It is no coincidence that it comes when Roark is about to become New York's greatest architect. She says, "Don't say anything about self-sacrifice or I'll break. . . . I didn't do it for you. . . . Now I'm not afraid to have this past night smeared all over their newspapers. My darling, do you see why I'm happy and why I'm free?" (671).

Nietzschean good and evil don't change their natures on rational whims like these. Dominique tries to destroy Roark. She helps

Toohey to destroy both Keating and Wynand. She loves neither herself nor others, destroys out of boredom and rebels against social structures—just because she can. Dominique, much like Keating, allows herself to be victimized by good and evil. Because she loves and has the potential for greatness but is too self-hating to strive to achieve it naturally, Dominique chooses a nothing existence. She chooses a life of self-imposed slavery and weakness. Both her idleness and the fact that she's given up on life (both forms of weakness that true Nietzschean heroes want to crush) are evidence that she should be the true villain.

Dominique enjoys her destructive power—Toohey doesn't. This is why she should be the true villain—she's more realistic. Kaufmann (1968, 278) argues, "Nietzsche's position can be summarized quite briefly: happiness is the fusion of power and joy—and joy contains not only ingredients of pleasure but also a component of pain." Dominique gets pleasure from causing pain to herself and others. Furthermore, whether from Keating, Wynand or Roark, she also enjoys the parasitical life sustenance she receives as their wife with no professional life of her own. She says, "I want to fit myself into Peter's life just as it is" (Rand 1943, 379).

Although she makes Wynand suffer by badgering him for the type of mediocrity the *Banner* supports,[11] she enjoys and lives off of the wealth created by it.[12] This two-faced action represents Dominique's power of destruction and the painful joy it brings her in the Nietzschean tradition.

Unlike Dominique, Toohey gets no pleasure or pain [forms of Nietzschean joy] from his evil. He says to Keating, "Why should I help you lie to yourself? I've done that for ten years. . . . You're a complete success, Peter, as far as I'm concerned. But at times I have to want to turn away from the sight of my successes. . . . You make me sick" (633–34). Just as Wynand is more realistic Nietzschean good, Dominique is more realistic Nietzschean evil. Both Roark and Toohey represent unrealistic moral extremes. Hank Rearden's wife, Lillian, Dominique's equivalent in *Atlas Shrugged*, tries to destroy him just as Dominique tries to destroy Wynand.

Like Brett Ashley of Ernest Hemingway's novel *The Sun Also Rises* (1926), Dominique is a femme fatale idler who distracts and weakens males with her sexual allurement. Barbara Grizzuti Harrison ([1978]

1999, 74–75) says, "Rand says that she appeals to 'rational egoists.' I think, on the contrary, that she appeals both to narcissism and to self-hatred, traits which are apparently mutually exclusive but which in fact often coexist in one fragmented personality: scratch a narcissist, and you often find, beneath the veneer of braggadocio, a frightened self-loather."

Dominique is a pain freak who doesn't fight for a side, but idly enjoys being beaten and used. "Rand gave us women who were ruthless with those they perceived to be their inferiors, but who blissfully received 'dark satisfaction in pain' from the men they adored. From there, of course, it's a skip and a jump to sadomasochism . . . if women want S&M dream trips, they have only to read Ayn Rand" (74).

Dominique, then, is an opportunistic slave of both sides, good and evil. She continually switches sides. She destroys others and pretends to be a heroine while doing it. That's more deceitful and two-faced than Toohey. At least Toohey chooses a side—evil, and stays true to it. He maintains a consistent purpose of destruction. Unlike Toohey, Dominique switches sides at her convenience. She always jumps onto the side winning at the time. She fights against Roark at first when others are succeeding at destroying him. Then she marries him at the end when she sees that he's winning and becoming successful. She drops Wynand after his paper loses popularity.

Dominique breaks Rand's most important Objectivist rule—"Man must live for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself" (Rand 1964, 27). She sacrifices herself for Roark. Dominique says to Roark, "But I will live for you, through every minute and every shameful act I take, I will live for you in my own way, in the only way I can" (Rand 1943, 376). In breaking Rand's cardinal rule, Dominique adheres to Nietzsche's advice about self-sacrifice in making way for the Superman. "I love him who works and invents that he may build a house for the Superman and prepare earth, animals, and plants for him: thus he wills his own downfall" (Nietzsche [1883] 1969, 44 prologue, ch. 4). Just like Dagny Taggart [Superwoman heroine of *Atlas Shrugged*], Dominique is smart and talented enough to easily embrace her role as Superwoman—but she refuses it.

Although she takes her place as servant to the Superman, Dagny

is also a Superwoman railroad tycoon. Den Uyl (1999, 72–73) proclaims that "The problem is . . . that when compared, for example, to Dagny Taggart of *Atlas Shrugged*, she [Dominique] is little else in this novel but Roark's lover and destroyer. Unlike Dagny, whom we see in a full independent productive role and with a personal past and future, Dominique lacks a certain development as a whole person. Perhaps Rand did not fill her in because Dominique is closer to Rand than Rand would have liked to admit."

Dominique is neither a Nietzschean Superwoman nor one of Rand's heroines. By sacrificing herself to the Superman, she cannot be a Nietzschean Superwoman and remains among the common herd of mediocrity. Nevertheless, Dominique possesses the necessary talents to be great and becomes a subordinate to the Superman by choice—unlike most common and mediocre characters—like Peter Keating. Keating wants to be a Superman and can't be; Dominique can be a Superwoman and doesn't want to be.

Furthermore, any type of self-sacrifice also makes her unable to be a "common woman" type of Randian heroine, such as the characters Mike Donnigan (in *The Fountainhead*) or Eddie Willers (in *Atlas Shrugged*). Dominique works to destroy not only extreme good [Roark] but also everybody in between extreme good and evil: Roark on his way to the top, Wynand and Keating. Like Keating, she works against herself. "Dominique is, in some respects, a person divided against herself" (Den Uyl 1999, 71). She never tries to destroy extreme evil [Toohey], but she allows Toohey to destroy her. She wants to destroy herself and bring everybody else down with her and Toohey. Toohey wants a world of only "common" and mediocre men; Dominique unrealistically wants a world of totally extreme good or extreme evil—no in-between. Dominique is a sick and stifled character of Nietzschean Superwoman ingredients and a Randian villain more dangerous than Toohey.

She does more work for Toohey than for Roark. Dominique is more of what a Randian or Nietzschean villain would look like in real life. Parasites usually manipulate their victims for selfish gain. Toohey is evil, but not realistic. When compared to his parallel character in *Atlas Shrugged*, James Taggart, their motivations are different. Taggart, like Dominique, is a parasite for the purpose of gaining unearned wealth. Toohey represents evil for evil's sake—with

no profit for himself. Merrill (1991, 52) agrees when he states that "Rand pays a price for making Toohey so perfect a representation of evil." This makes his character lose reality. Rand uses Toohey not really as a character but as a personification of evil. He might be best compared to Goethe's Mephistopheles.

As a realistic version of Toohey's evil, Dominique teams up with him to destroy Roark and Keating. Toohey says to Dominique, "You need me, Dominique. . . . The Lindsay home was better—Roark was definitely considered, I think he would have got it but for you. The Stonebrook Clubhouse also—he had a chance at that, which you ruined. . . . You've done remarkably well, my congratulations. . . . My dear, surely you haven't forgotten that it was I who gave you the idea in the first place. . . . This is a pact, my dear. An alliance. . . . It is not necessary to have a noble aim in common. It is necessary only to have a common enemy" (Rand 1943, 279–81). Dominique marries Keating and Wynand for parasitical financial sustenance—not love. She offers marriage to Keating only to destroy his potentially happy marriage to Catherine. It is implied that Toohey is behind Dominique's proposal.[13]

When considering her evil motives, Den Uyl (1999) says:

> Apart from wondering why a woman as self-sufficient and strong willed as Dominique would surrender to any man, and why romance cannot take place without either partner "surrendering" to the other, it is hard to imagine why one would devote an extraordinary amount of effort to destroying the life of the one to whom she is to surrender! The answer just given, that one wishes to protect what one loves, seems somewhat less than convincing with a character as strong and able as Roark to take care of himself and to assess his own risks. . . . Of course, we could say that Dominique is trying to protect not Roark but rather herself, from having to witness what the world might do to Roark or, more plausibly, from having to witness its lack of appreciation of him. But it is hard to find much rationality in this. Wouldn't it make more sense to allow herself to appreciate and enjoy what Roark can accomplish, however limited and unappreciated it may be, than to destroy it before she can witness it?

> Does it really make sense to allow an idea [or its manifestation] to exist only when the environment for its reception is perfect and people will appreciate it as they ought? If Dominique were to succeed in destroying Roark, what exactly would she gain? Moreover, why would it not be worthier to fight for the cause, however hopeless, than to try to destroy it? (64–65)

My only explanation for Den Uyl's considerations is that Dominique should be characterized as a true villain, like Lillian Rearden of *Atlas Shrugged*. She's a tragic heroine in the Nietzschean tradition. Although Dominique is more evil than good, like Lillian, Rand simply saves her, as she does Hank Rearden. Lillian, just like Dominique, is a parasitical and idle woman who has bitten the hand that has fed her all her life. She lives off of Hank's wealth and schemes with the looters to take away his main source of happiness—his steel mills. Dominique looks nothing like Hank Rearden, the moral-middle of the way character in *Atlas Shrugged*. Wynand looks most like Rearden, whose guilt turns to greatness among the heroes of Galt's Gulch.

Dominique is more of an opportunist than Wynand. Wynand's success is based on a lucrative opportunity he took to create an empire based on his own work and effort. Dominique's success at the novel's end is based on a profitable opportunity she took to become a wife with these men, not out of love, but for the titles. She's with them only for the time that they are successful and on top. She lives off them, achieves nothing and does no work for herself, then leaves them when she's bored and they're out of money and/or popularity. At the novel's end, Roark had better remain New York's best (or greatest) architect for the rest of his life. If he doesn't, Dominique will leave him to be, at least the mistress of the greatest man on top of the world.

Rand's main shortcoming in *The Fountainhead*, in relation to Nietzscheanism, is Roark's integrity. This not only clouds his greatness, it mistakenly makes him idealistically "good" and "perfect." Furthermore, "integrity" waters down the true aspects of both Nietzschean greatness and the will to power in Roark's character. Rand should have wanted Roark to be the true Nietzschean Superman

that Wynand is—not the watered down version that he is: between the Capitalist Superman (Wynand) and the Socialist Superman (Jack London's Ernest Everhard). In terms of the Nietzschean "will to power," Roark is an unrealistic and hypocritical character. In reality, the Nietzschean Capitalist Superman, like Theodore Dreiser's Frank Cowperwood, doesn't truly care about personal integrity. Rand's version doesn't care about it either, but Roark pretends to care. Through Roark, Rand hypocritically denies that her sweepstakes are for the same goal as the *Übermensch*—power.

Being a Nietzschean Superman, especially for such an advocate of capitalism as Rand, should be more about obtaining power than Roark's "integrity of the soul." Roark's goal, to be New York's greatest architect, brings new wealth and power with it that he has never had at his disposal. The novel ends before Roark gains this corrupting power.

Roark's false and melodramatic images of integrity and goodness lose reality in his character. In the Nietzschean tradition, Wynand should be Rand's true hero and Dominique should be her true villain. Unlike Dominique, Toohey works for *his own* living and goal of universal slavery. Even Keating makes a failed attempt at greatness. Not trying is worse than failure. Dominique is more evil than Keating or Toohey because she doesn't try to achieve her own rewards, lives off the work of others and strives for *their* goals instead of her own.

Notes

1. *Journals of Ayn Rand* quoted in Cox 1998, 54.

2. See Rand 1943, 126–27; 96–97. Roark cannot take orders from his superiors Guy Francon or John Erik Snyte in his early architecture jobs. Against the boss' orders, Roark intrudes upon a drawing in Snyte's office and changes it into his own. He also refuses to do a classical drawing for Guy Francon. These are both examples of "taking" his rightful place of power as opposed to naturally willing himself into it. Roark knows he can't obey orders well nor do the type of work that Snyte and Francon prefer. Nevertheless, he accepts the job with Francon to please his friend, Peter Keating, and accepts the mediocrity of Snyte's job. Knowing that he can't take orders well and being so unwilling to accept the terms of either employer—Roark should never have accepted these jobs in the first place. See also Rand 1943, 403. Just like Roark, Wynand does not take orders well either. Nevertheless, on his way to success, Wynand works in a grocery store and gives suggestions to his superior about running the business. When told that he doesn't run things and, to do his job, unlike Roark, he plays by the rules and accepts these terms of subordination.

3. See Branden 1986, 24. In relation to Rand's characters and their humanistic

values, it reads: "She [Rand] was later to say that he [Victor Hugo] was the *single* influence on her in all literature. . . . [Rand said] '*Les Misérables* [by Hugo] was *the* big experience. Everything about it became important to me, holy; everything that reminded me of it was a souvenir of my love. . . . I didn't approve of the ideas about the poor and disinherited, except that Hugo set them up in a way that I could sympathize with; they were victims of government, of the aristocracy, or established authority.'" Therefore, Roark's integrity and egotism are humanistic constructs of Hugo's literary tradition. He feels pity for Keating. He refuses Wynand's offer because he does not want to become just another helpless victim of it like Keating. Furthermore, he does Keating's work for him out of Rand's same sympathetic desire [when reading Hugo's novels] to help the "poor" and disenfranchised part of humanity to excel along with himself. Roark kills two birds with one stone in helping Keating. He egotistically shows off his greatness as an architect, through Keating's plagiarized work, and he helps the aspect of humanity to succeed that Nietzsche would call "the weak" and Hugo would call the "poor and disinherited."

4. Although this is perhaps the most important tenet of Rand's Objectivism, it is by no means the only one nor representative of her entire philosophy. For a more in-depth discussion of Rand's Objectivism, see "The Objectivist Ethics" in Rand 1964, 13–35.

5. Cited from page 44 of Nietzsche [1889] 1968.

6. Quentin Daniels, the up and coming inventor of *Atlas Shrugged*, is Rand's best portrayal of what the rational Nietzschean hero should look like. The only problem is that Daniels is a secondary character. We cannot see very many of his tendencies in either his private or professional life. John Galt is also very close to this. Nevertheless, in one instance of the novel, when the villains are torturing him, Galt advises them in repairing the broken device. This is similar to Roark's helping of Keating in that he is using the weak to show off his greatness. Wynand, unlike Galt or Roark, uses the power of wealth, the result of his greatness and raw ability, as his egotistical show of force. Neither Galt nor Roark should have to show or prove their greatness to the weak—even out of their tremendous egotism. Furthermore, the heroes of *Atlas Shrugged* look more Nietzschean than Roark. Therefore, this makes Rand's break with Nietzsche look even less credible. Rand's heroes are more Nietzschean in her latter career—not less. Dagny Taggart and Hank Rearden refuse to join the strikers out of a love for and desire to save their great companies more than from a humanistic love for the weak world or any of its inhabitants.

7. Rand speaks of a similar type of "beauty and greatness" in her nonfiction. See Rand 1971, 172. She says, "Those who seek the sight of beauty and greatness are motivated by fear, they [the Naturalists] claim."

8. See Rand 1943, 532–35 for the scene of Wynand's offer to Roark. When Roark is told that he was taking a risk by refusing Wynand's offer, he says that he had an ally he could trust—Wynand's "integrity." The true trait that Roark admires in him is not integrity; it's the strength and greatness of Wynand in the Nietzschean tradition. Also, see Rand 1943, 400–408 for Wynand's biographical rise from a poor longshoreman's son in a tenement slum of Hell's Kitchen to the wealthy newspaper tycoon of *The Banner*.

9. In relation to Kristin Robinson's point here, I would argue that the heroes of *Atlas Shrugged* are less humanistic than Roark is. For example, Hank Rearden and

Dagny Taggart are skeptical of the strike and are the last to join it more out of love for their companies than for society as a whole. They want to save their companies more than humankind. Roark is the most humanistic Randian hero. Smaller traces of humanism can be found in John Galt, Dagny Taggart and Hank Rearden. Dagny helps Hank overcome guilt. Hank carries his weak and parasitical family for much of their lives. Out of his own egotism, while being tortured by the villains, Galt helps them to fix the malfunctioning machine.

10. See Kaufmann 1968, 370, which cites page 57 of Friedrich Nietzsche's *Anti-Christ* (1889).

11. See Rand 1943, 491–96. As Wynand's wife, Dominique enjoys making him suffer by requesting that he sit with her through the terrible play *No Skin Off Your Nose*, which was supported and endorsed by Wynand's newspaper. Here she creates and enjoys painful suffering for both herself and Wynand. She also verbally challenges Wynand about the play and asks to hear his opinion about it openly, despite the fact that she already knows what he thinks of it.

12. Dominique accepts and enjoys the wealth and life sustenance created by the mediocrity that *The Banner* promotes. "When she [Dominique] wanted to buy a pair of shoes, he [Wynand] had three stores send a collection of shoes for her choice. . . . When she said she wanted to see a certain picture, he had a projection room built on the roof. She obeyed, for the first few months. When she realized that she loved their isolation, she broke it at once" (Rand 1943, 488). This is two-faced evil and biting the hand that feeds her. If she hates the newspaper's creations so much, she should not accept the idle and luxurious living that it supports for her. Even though she breaks off the isolation, she still lives the same type of wealthy lifestyle as Mrs. Wynand Papers.

13. See Rand 1943, 366–71. Keating goes to Toohey's house to see his niece Katie [Keating's girlfriend whom he really loves]. Toohey can see and sense that the two are getting closer and happier than he would like. On this trip to Toohey's house, Keating proposes marriage to Katie the very next day. When Keating gets back home that night, Dominique shows up at his door to propose marriage to him immediately. This is no coincidence. There's no other way that Dominique could have known that Keating and Katie were planning to marry the next day if Toohey, Katie's uncle, had not told Dominique and persuaded her to marry Keating before he could elope with Katie the next day.

References

Bell-Villada, Gene. 2004. Who was Ayn Rand? *Salmagundi* 141/142. (Winter/Spring): 236–40.

Bergman, Frithjof. 1988. Nietzsche's critique on morality. *Reading Nietzsche*, edited by Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 29–45.

Branden, Barbara. 1986. *The Passion of Ayn Rand.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

Chambers, Whittaker. 1957. Big sister is watching you. *National Review* (28 December): 594–96.

Clowes, Edith M. 1986. Literary reception as vulgarization: Nietzsche's idea of the

superman in neo-realist fiction. In *Nietzsche in Russia*, edited by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 315–29.

Cox, Stephen. 1986. Ayn Rand: Theory versus creative life. *The Journal of Libertarian Studies* 8, no. 1 (Winter): 19–29.

___. 1998. The evolution of Ayn Rand. *Liberty* 11 (July): 49–57. Online at: <http://www.libertysoft.com/liberty/reviews/66cox.html>.

Den Uyl, Douglas J. 1999. *The Fountainhead: An American Novel.* New York: Twayne Publishers.

Evans, M. Stanton. 1967. The gospel according to Ayn Rand. *National Review* (3 October): 1059–63.

Faguet, Emile. 1918. *On Reading Nietzsche.* New York: Moffat, Yard and Company.

Harpham, Geoffrey. 1975. Jack London and the tradition of superman socialism. *American Studies* 16: 23–33.

Harrison, Barbara Grizzuti. [1978] 1999. Psyching out Ayn Rand. In *Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand*, edited by Mimi Reisel Gladstein and Chris Matthew Sciabarra. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 67–76.

Hugo, Victor. [1862] 1964. *Les Misérables.* Translated by Charles E. Wilbur; abridged by Paul Benichou. New York: Washington Square Press.

Kaufmann, Walter. 1959. *From Shakespeare to Existentialism: Studies in Poetry, Religion and Philosophy.* Boston: Beacon Hill Press.

___. 1968. *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mencken, H. L. [1913] 1993. *The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.* New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.

Merrill, Ronald E. 1991. *The Ideas of Ayn Rand.* LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. [1883] 1969. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra.* Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

___. [1889] 1968. *Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ.* Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

Picart, Caroline Joan. 1999. *Resentment and the "Feminine" in Nietzsche's Politico-Aesthetics.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Rand, Ayn. 1943. *The Fountainhead.* New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

___. 1957. *Atlas Shrugged.* New York: New American Library.

___. 1959. *We the Living.* New York: Random House.

___. 1964. *The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism.* New York: New American Library.

___. 1971. *The Romantic Manifesto.* New York: New American Library.

___. [1971] 1999. *Return of the Primitive: The Anti-Industrial Revolution.* Edited by Peter Schwartz. New York: Meridian.

Robinson, Kristin. 1989. Ayn Rand's Objectivism: A humanistic interpretation. *The Humanist* (January/February): 29–30.

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew. 1995. *Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Sheaffer, Robert. 1999. Rereading Rand on gender in the light of Paglia. In *Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand*, edited by Mimi Reisel Gladstein and Chris Matthew Sciabarra. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 299–317.

Thiele, Leslie Paul. 1990. *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul.* Princeton:

Princeton University Press.
Walker, Jeff. 1999. *The Ayn Rand Cult*. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court.