

Will the Real Apollo Please Stand Up? Rand, Nietzsche, and the Reason-Emotion Dichotomy

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Despite his being a purely imaginary being, the Greek god Apollo has long been an object of interest, if not fascination or reverence, in our culture. Many people have even gone so far as to identify or characterize themselves in terms of what they believe to be one or another of his (purportedly) salient attributes, such as reason, feeling, inspiration, creativity, etc.—or to reject Apollo altogether, preferring instead to personally identify with a different god such as Prometheus, Epimetheus, etc.

Moreover, the practice of Apollo worship or emulation continues to the present day, not only among adherents to the philosophy of Ayn Rand, or to the temperament theory of personality expounded by David Keirse, but also more generally among those who fancy themselves to be more in the refined, emotionally restrained, tradition-respecting “Classical” mode. Each of these groups thinks that they understand something essential about Apollo’s nature and character, either in terms of philosophical aspects of his personality, his behavioral traits, or his social persona.

Randians identify with Apollo qua advocates of reason vs. irrational feeling. Keirseans identify with Apollo insofar as they prefer intuition and feeling rather than intuition plus thinking, sensing plus judging, or sensing plus perceiving. Many others, more traditionally, might identify with Apollo insofar as they prefer calm, serene, “rational,” restrained, “Classical” thought and action rather than agitated, passionate, “irrational,” unrestrained, “Romantic” thought and action.

Such a “Tower of Babel” situation prompts one to wonder: who

is the real Apollo?²—and therefore, which reasons for identifying with Apollo are historically-culturally accurate?

One central aim of this essay is to explore the basis of Ayn Rand's identification of Apollo as "The God of Reason," as well as the basis of the claim by psychologist David Keirseay that Apollo was instead characterized by emotion or "feeling;" and it will argue that, even within the framework of a valid distinction between reason and the emotions, it is not correct to identify Apollo as either pro-reason or pro-emotion per se. It will further argue, by means of combining insights from personality type theory and the cultural-mythological record, that Apollo was, most fundamentally, the god neither of reason, nor of emotion, but, instead, of *intuition*. Most importantly from an Objectivist standpoint, this essay will show Rand's adoption of Apollo as "The God of Reason" to have been based on a misreading of Nietzsche, as well as a failure to understand Apollo's original status and role in Greek culture.

This essay also delves into the reason-emotion dichotomy, as well as the factual matter as to what extent, or in what form, either Friedrich Nietzsche or Ayn Rand endorsed it. It speculates that the traditional false dichotomy of reason vs. emotion, with its either-or polarization of thinking and feeling, has so monopolized and distorted discussions of mind and character that, among other things, it has obscured Apollo's fundamentally intuitive nature.

Reason vs. Emotion?

Ayn Rand, writing in various essays, held that reason is the power to engage in a deliberate (volitional) and logical process of thinking,¹ and in her epistemology monograph (1990) she defined "thinking" as a "purposefully directed process of cognition," sharply contrasting reason with emotion, viewing the latter as "an automatic response proceeding from an evaluation of an existent" (41). Thus, as Rand characterizes them, respectively, reason or thinking is a deliberately enacted cause, while emotion is an automatic effect of one's thinking and evaluation.

The standard version of the reason-emotion dichotomy is the age-old notion that reason and emotion are fundamentally different and antagonistic functions within human consciousness. Reason being a cognitive process, while the emotions are non-cognitive processes (so

the argument goes), they are irreconcilable opposites, necessarily warring with one another and subjecting human beings to a life of conflict and misery. The earlier Stoics, Plato, Kant, and Sartre all held such a view.

It's true that Rand didn't accept the reason-emotion dichotomy in its pure form—i.e., in the simple, unqualified, non-nuanced form in which it is typically stated. Indeed, she unequivocally rejected it in an interview with *Playboy* magazine (1964b, 6):

There is no necessary clash, no dichotomy between man's reason and his emotions—provided he observes their proper relationship. . . . This relationship cannot be reversed. . . . If a man takes his emotions as the cause and his mind as their passive effect, if he is guided by his emotions and uses his mind only to rationalize or justify them somehow—*then* he is acting immorally, he is condemning himself to misery, failure, defeat, and he will achieve nothing but destruction—his own and that of others.

However, she did restate it in her essay “Apollo and Dionysus” (1969–70) as “the conflict of reason versus *irrational* emotion” (101; emphasis added), which she also referred to as “the fundamental conflict of our age” (100). So, Rand acknowledged that there is a serious clash between reason and emotion, at least in some very significant ways, even if not fundamentally or metaphysically.

Now, a clash or conflict is not necessarily a dichotomy. So, the question arises: does Rand's more limited statement of the reason-emotion conflict amount to the identification of a full-fledged dichotomy? I think it's clear that it does.

A *dichotomy*, as Wikipedia states, is “any splitting of a whole into exactly two non-overlapping parts. In other words, it is a bipartition of elements which are mutually exclusive, nothing can belong simultaneously to both parts, and everything must belong to one part or the other.”

The Law of the Excluded Middle, which states that a thing is either A or non-A, outlines the form of any genuine dichotomy. Such a dichotomy consists of two alternatives that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the possibilities within a given domain or

context of knowledge.² Any two-fold alternative that *purports* to be a dichotomy, but that is *not* of this form, is *not* a dichotomy, and is thus commonly referred to as a “false dichotomy.”³

Precisely speaking, however, it is not actually a *dichotomy* that is false, but *an opposition that is falsely stated to be a dichotomy*.⁴ A false dichotomy, then, is an opposition that *purports* to present mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities, which in fact are *not* mutually exclusive or jointly exhaustive (or both).⁵

In the case of the reason-emotion dichotomy, reason and emotion, while distinguishable, are *not* mutually exclusive from one another. They are concomitant, necessarily connected aspects of a cognitive-evaluative experience. One has a thought, one evaluates the object of that thought, and one experiences an emotion about that thing as a response to the evaluation. Thus, as Branden (1969) writes, “One of the forms in which [one’s] appraisals present themselves to man’s conscious mind is his *emotions*... *An emotion is the psychosomatic form in which man experiences his estimate of the beneficial or harmful relationship of some aspect of reality to himself*” (67; emphasis in original).

Moreover, while some emotions do flow from reason, i.e., from the rational identification and evaluation of a fact of reality, other emotions flow from *irrational* identifications and evaluations. When Rand uses the term “irrational emotion,” she is referring to emotions generated by irrational identifications and evaluations. A “rational emotion,” then, is one that follows from (and is consonant with) rational identifications and evaluations.

Thus, there is a necessary linkage between thought and emotion, so the rational or irrational status of an emotion is really just a consequence of the status of the rational or irrational identification and evaluation that led to it. In other words, the bottom line of this analysis is that reason and emotion are *neither* mutually exclusive *nor* jointly exhaustive of the possibilities.

Thus, when Rand refers to the historical reason-emotion split as an “alleged dichotomy,” she means that it is a *false* dichotomy (i.e., a falsely stated dichotomy)—and that asserting it is a fallacy. It fails *both* conditions for a real dichotomy.

Reason and emotion are not mutually exclusive. An emotion is the automatic result of some process of thought and evaluation. Thus, a given process of reason and a given emotion can and do co-

exist as cause and effect, whether the emotion is the result of that or some other process of thought.

Reason and emotion are not jointly exhaustive, for they do not exhaust the possibilities. There is also anti-reason, whether in the form of choosing to think irrationally or in the form of choosing not to think. Either choice generates irrational emotions that can and *do* conflict with reason. But that does not mean that *any and all* emotion inherently conflicts with reason, just the emotion *generated by anti-reason!* In other words, reason and emotion are not antagonistic per se, but only when a rational thought-emotion linkage conflicts with an irrational thought-emotion linkage.

The *real* dichotomy, the *true* dichotomy (redundantly speaking), involved in reason and emotion is: *reason vs. irrationality*—which in the context of our emotional experience means: *reason and consequent rational emotion vs. irrationality and consequent irrational emotion*.⁶ This, as I maintain and will show, is *exactly* the version of the reason-emotion dichotomy that Rand endorsed, though she did not use precisely those words.⁷ And as one would expect from Rand's penetrating insightfulness, it is a much more complex and nuanced dichotomy than the standard, crude, simplistic one of reason vs. emotion in general.

It takes just two simple steps to get from the above, fully explicit form of the dichotomy to the truncated, but still valid form in which Rand states it. First, insert parentheses as follows to separate off the less salient feature of each alternative: *reason (and consequent rational emotion) vs. (irrationality and consequent) irrational emotion*. Second, delete the parenthetical material: *reason vs. irrational emotion*. Reason vs. irrational emotion is both, as Rand says, “the fundamental conflict of our age” and, as I have just shown, a real dichotomy—and the *statement* of it a “true dichotomy.”

So, in Rand's characteristically cogent fashion, we are offered the identification of a conflict that truly *is* a dichotomy—not between reason and emotion in general, but between reason and *irrational* emotion. This is a solid, real dichotomy based on two irreconcilable kinds of causal linkages in human consciousness.

Apollonian Reason and Dionysian Irrational Emotion —Irreconcilable?

The reason that real dichotomies are irreconcilable is that, metaphysically, a dichotomy is a fundamental opposition, two alternatives that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the possibilities. Such an opposition is necessarily irreconcilable. It's either-or. Thus, some statements of such opposition *must* be true, and others *must* be false. It is our task to identify which.

In particular, at any given time, and in any given respect, one is either using reason (and consequently experiencing rational emotion) or one is (using irrationality and consequently) experiencing irrational emotion.⁸ Reason and irrational emotion do not integrate or reconcile. It's either-or. So, while not all conflicts are dichotomies, at least some *are*, as is seen by the fact that reason vs. irrational emotion is a dichotomy. "Reason or irrational emotion" *is* "the fundamental conflict of our age" and, as stated, it names a *true* dichotomy, a truly *irreconcilable* division of an area of reality, two alternatives that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the possibilities.

False dichotomies (i.e., non-dichotomies *alleged* to be dichotomies) are *not* necessarily irreconcilable. "Reason vs. emotion" is just such a false (i.e., falsely alleged) dichotomy. Reason and emotion are not irreconcilable, but readily compatible, when the emotions are consequent to rational thought. It is *true dichotomies* (i.e., things correctly asserted as being dichotomies) that are necessarily irreconcilable. Reason vs. irrational emotion—i.e., emotion consequent to irrational thinking—is a real dichotomy, and reason and irrational emotion are irreconcilable. As long as an irrational emotion exists, it will always be in conflict with, and cannot be reconciled with, a rational thought. There is a *real* dichotomy between reason and irrational emotion, and they are *necessarily* in conflict and cannot be reconciled as long as they both exist.

When Rand says that reason and irrational emotion are the fundamental conflicting factors of our age, she means just that—and that the only way to end the conflict is not to "reconcile" them, but to *eradicate* the irrational emotions by eradicating the irrational thoughts/unreason (in the form of bad philosophical premises) that generate them. She spells out the thoughts to replace the irrational

ideas with, but she never identifies the replacement or refers to it as a process of “reconciliation,” neither of irrational emotions with reason nor irrational ideas with reason.⁹

Nietzsche, by contrast, believed that Apollonian reason and Dionysian emotion *could* somehow be reconciled. Kaufmann, in his commentary on Nietzsche ([1872] 1967), says that in *Twilight of the Idols* (1888), Nietzsche synthesized Dionysus and Apollo as “the creative employment of the passions and the affirmation of life in spite of suffering,” to oppose both of them to “the Christian negation of life and extirpation of the passions” (20).

It might be thought that Nietzsche was betraying the rational Apollonian element in embracing the irrational Dionysian element, but it is more likely that Nietzsche simply did not view Apollo as purely rational, as Rand and the prevailing traditional interpretation take Apollo to be. Quite possibly, furthermore, there may be seeds within Nietzsche’s portrait of Apollo that point toward an entirely different characterization of him from the one that Rand and many others have adopted.

God of Reason?

As artists and scientists seek to find images and metaphors to help convey their insights, they often make use of mythical characters, such as the ancient Greek gods and demigods. For instance, Rand named her longest novel, *Atlas Shrugged*, after the Greek demigod who held the heavens on his shoulders.¹⁰

In presenting her case for reason and individualism, Rand also wrote a number of nonfiction essays during the 1960s and 1970s, and she made effective use of various mythical and archetypal characters.¹¹ One of the most provocative of these essays is “Apollo vs. Dionysus,” a comparison of the vast cultural and philosophical differences between the U.S. Moon Program and the Woodstock Music Festival. In it, she portrays the hippies at Woodstock as being immersed in the irrationalist, Dionysian worldview and ethos, in contrast to those carrying out the Apollo Moon Project, whom she characterizes as acting in the best spirit of a pro-reason, Apollonian outlook.

Rand is unequivocal in her black-and-white depiction of the forces of reason and anti-reason, equating Apollo, the Sun God, with reason and Dionysus, the God of Wine, with the emotions. In

developing this comparison, Rand explicitly draws on the distinction made by Friedrich Nietzsche¹² in *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*. Rand (1969–70) writes:

Apollo, in Nietzsche’s metaphysics, is the symbol of beauty, order, wisdom, efficacy (though Nietzsche equivocates about this last)—i.e., the symbol of reason. Dionysus, on the other hand represents wild, primeval feelings, orgiastic joy, the dark, the savage, the unintelligible element in man—i.e., the symbol of emotion. (99–100)

Nietzsche ([1872] 1967) himself, however, offers a rather more complex view of Apollo’s character in particular. On the one hand, he does sketch a fairly clear view of the “rational” side of Apollo cited by Rand: “[W]e must keep in mind that measured restraint, that freedom from the wilder emotions, that calm of the sculptor god” (35).

However, it should be borne in mind that this Classical, so-called “rational” model of orderliness, calmness, and restraint is *not* a distinguishing characteristic of reason. Indeed, rigid guidelines and prescriptions for literature, music, etc. are usually imposed by those assuming the mantle of social or religious authority and are more typical of tradition-bound imitation than of genuine rational, creative thought.

On the other hand, furthermore, Nietzsche points to a much more profound side of Apollo’s nature:

This joyous necessity of the dream experience has been embodied by the Greeks in their Apollo: *Apollo, the god of all plastic energies, is at the same time the soothsaying god*. He, who (as the etymology of the name indicates) is the “shining one,” the deity of light, is also ruler over the beautiful illusion of the inner world of fantasy. . . . *[T]his deep consciousness of nature, healing and helping in sleep and dreams, is at the same time the symbolical analogue of the soothsaying faculty and of the arts generally, which make life possible and worth living*. (35; emphasis added)

We will further explore this side of Apollo shortly, but it should

be clear that soothsaying and dreams, which are virtually signature attributes of Apollo, are *not* rational activities. The function of reason in Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* is, in fact, represented not by Apollo, but by Socrates and his dialectic.¹³

Although Nietzsche's Schopenhauer-inspired terminology seems to be original with him, his Dionysian vs. Apollonian (or Apollinian) polarity seems to have been present in fact, if not in name, throughout much of Western history since the time of Ancient Greece.¹⁴ As Meyer (1989) notes:

It seems probable that Western culture has from its beginnings been marked by a tension between the claims of Apollonian classicism and those of Dionysian romanticism. Classicism has been characterized by a valuing of shared conventions and rational restraint, the playful exploitation of established constraints and the satisfaction of actuality (Being), the coherence of closed forms and the clarity of explicit meanings; while romanticism has been characterized by a valuing of the peculiarities of individual innovation and the yearning arising from potentiality (Becoming), the informality of open structures and the suggestiveness of implicit significance. . . . Countless critics and historians of the arts have remarked upon the continuing oscillation from one of these general outlooks to the other. (163)

As already noted, Rand rejects, and rightly so, the supposed metaphysical necessity of a reason-emotion dichotomy, as well as what she regards as tradition's superficial equation of classicism with reason, and of romanticism with emotion.¹⁵ More importantly, however, even though she also rightly rejects Nietzsche's opinion of the relative value of reason and emotion, Rand has, like so many other writers before and since Nietzsche, adopted, without qualification or reservation, the identification of Apollo with reason.

There is *some* epistemic justification for this. Rand ponders the handful of traits of Apollo that were mentioned by Nietzsche and then, in her characteristic manner, performs an act of conceptual abstraction, isolating what she takes to be the fundamental trait of Apollo from the welter of other features.¹⁶ It is clear that she believes

reason to be Apollo's fundamental characteristic, the one that underlies and explains all the others—even though it is not Apollo but Socrates who represents reason in Nietzsche's perspective.

For another thing, although it is not merely a literary device to do so, identifying Apollo with reason suits Rand's purposes of exposition. She writes:

Symbolic figures are a valuable adjunct to philosophy: they help men to integrate and bear in the mind the essential meaning of complex issues. Apollo and Dionysus represent the fundamental conflict of our age. And for those who may regard them as floating abstractions, reality has offered two perfect, fiction-like dramatizations of these abstract symbols: at Cape Kennedy and at Woodstock. They were perfect in every respect demanded of serious fiction: they concretized the *essentials* of the two principles involved, in action, in a pure, extreme, isolated form. The fact that the spacecraft was called "Apollo" is merely a coincidence, but a helpful coincidence. (Rand 1969–70, 100)

Rand is correct about the integrative power of symbolic figures such as the Greek gods, and there are good reasons for giving Apollo a prominent place in symbolizing important human issues. However, as should become clear by the conclusion of this essay, her linking of Apollo specifically to reason is based on significant misconceptions about his character.¹⁷

God of Feeling?

A much different portrait of the Apollo metaphor is offered by psychologist David Keirsey. Espousing a variant of Jungian personality type theory he calls "temperament theory," he has written several books in which he uses characters from Greek mythology as labels for various "temperament types."¹⁸

Like the Neo-Jungians Katherine Myers and Isabel Myers Briggs and their followers in the Association for Psychological Type, Keirsey and his Temperament Theory partisans employ four dimensions, along which a person's preferences are identified by means of questionnaire and feedback assessment: Jung's three dimensions of

extraversion-introversion, sensing-intuition, and thinking-feeling, and a fourth dimension added much later by Myers and Briggs, judging-perceiving.¹⁹

The extraversion-introversion preference arises, as Myers (1980) notes, “from people’s relative interest in their outer and inner worlds”:

The introvert’s main interests are in the inner world of concepts and ideas, while the extravert is more involved with the outer world of people and things. Therefore, when circumstances permit, the introvert concentrates perception and judgment upon ideas, while the extravert likes to focus them on the outside environment. (7)

Sensing (i.e., sensory perception) and intuition are the two principal ways people have of perceiving (i.e., observing) the world. Intuition, Myers says, “is indirect perception by way of the unconscious, incorporating ideas or associations that the unconscious tacks on to perceptions coming from outside” (2).²⁰ Whichever process a person prefers, Myers adds, he will use it more, “paying closer attention to its stream of impressions and fashioning [his] idea of the world from what the process reveals. The other kind of perception will be background, a little out of focus” (2).

Thinking and feeling are people’s “two distinct and sharply contrasting ways of coming to conclusions” (3). As Myers characterizes our judgment processes:

In judging the ideas presented here [and in the present essay], a reader who considers first whether they are consistent and logical is using thinking-judgment. A reader who is conscious first that the ideas are pleasing or displeasing, supporting or threatening ideas already prized is using feeling-judgment. (3)

The judging-perceiving dimension is rather more controversial than the others, and is best thought of as expressing the polarity between a preference for dealing with the external world by means of one of the judging functions, thinking or feeling—as against a preference for dealing with the external world by means of one of the

perceiving functions, sensing or intuition.²¹ As a consequence, this dimension is also often regarded as revealing whether a given person prefers to use thinking or feeling to deal with the world around him in a decisive, closure-seeking, i.e., “judging” fashion, or instead to use sensing or intuiting in an open-ended, information-gathering, “perceiving” fashion.²² The ramifications of this dimension of temperament or personality type will become clearer shortly.

Keirsey identifies four basic types of people. Those who prefer thinking and intuition are “Prometheans” or “Rationals,”²³ while those preferring feeling and intuition are “Apollonians” or “Idealists.” Those who prefer sensing and judging are “Epimetheans” or “Guardians,” while those preferring sensing and perceiving are “Dionysians” or “Artisans.”

Keirsey had a fairly well developed rationale for connecting these temperaments with the four respective gods (or demi-gods) he selected as exemplars. The demi-god Prometheus is characterized, Keirsey says, by intuition and thinking—basically, abstract-level thinking, which manifests in a drive for competence and mastery over ideas and their application. The god Apollo, on the other hand, is the epitome of intuition and feeling, and specifically a yearning for authenticity and harmony and inspiration.²⁴

Both intuitive types, Apollo and Prometheus, stand in major contrast to the god Dionysus and the demi-god Epimetheus, who Keirsey says prefer sensory and sensual experience to abstract functioning (intuition), Dionysus being more spontaneous and pragmatic, while Epimetheus was more responsible and cooperative.

Most pertinent to the present inquiry, Keirsey does not regard Apollo as being an exemplar of reason. Instead, more than anything, he conceives of Apollo as being intuitive, preferring abstract-level functioning in some basically non-logical way that is also intimately connected with *feeling*, i.e., an intuitive-feeling type—while Prometheus is the quintessential man of logic (and not coincidentally, the quintessential Randian hero), the intuitive-*thinking* type.

Neither Reason nor Emotion?

Notwithstanding the vital points Rand and Keirsey each make about human character differences, I think there are problems in the way that each of them has sliced up the reality of human nature.

While I disagree with Rand's supposedly Nietzsche-based distinction between Apollo (reason) and Dionysus (anti-reason), I see Keirse's contrast between Prometheus (intuition plus thinking) and Apollo (intuition plus feeling) as being just as troublesome.

Although their views of the culture or character of Dionysus are somewhat similar, Rand's is decidedly more negative than Keirse's. Keirse views all four of the temperament types, including the Dionysians, as having good and important kinds of skills and perspectives,²⁵ while Rand, with such unflattering references (1969–70, 105) as “the zoos, the coffeehouses, and the colleges where they are bred,” clearly regards the Dionysians as little better than semi-civilized barbarians, barely one step above brute savagery.

Further, while Keirse would agree that Dionysians have a more concrete-oriented preference for sensing, some of them prefer thinking rather than feeling, whereas Rand (1969–70) sees *all* Dionysians as immersed in anti-reason and feeling-worship: “The hippies [of the 1969 Woodstock Music Festival] are the living demonstration of what it means to give up reason and to rely on one's primeval ‘instincts,’ ‘urges,’ ‘intuitions’—and whims” (117). In the same spirit, she mercilessly dissects Charles Lindbergh's contemporaneous paean to “intuition” and “instinct,” in preference to rationality and intellect, as the source of the motives for his pioneering efforts in aviation (106–9).

On the other hand, Rand and Keirse both have a favorable opinion about Prometheus. Rand has the hero of her first novel, *Anthem*, reject his collectively imposed name Equality 7-2521 and adopt the name Prometheus, after he was condemned for inventing the light bulb; and she describes John Galt, the hero of her magnum opus, *Atlas Shrugged*, as “Prometheus who changed his mind. After centuries of being torn by vultures in payment for having brought men the fire of the gods, he broke his chains and he withdrew his fire—until the day men withdraw their vultures” (1957, 517). Keirse, for his part, even noted (1998, 162, 182; 1978, 54) that two (to him, typical) Randian heroes, Dagny Taggart in *Atlas Shrugged* and Howard Roark in *The Fountainhead*, were clearly Rational-Promethean in temperament.

Rand and Keirse both also think well of Apollo, though the details of their views of his nature and character differ markedly. To

Rand, Apollo seems to have been just a variant on the reason/thinking/logic-wielding Prometheus; but to Keirsej, Prometheus was the symbol of thinking combined with intuition, while Apollo represented not thinking, but *feeling* plus intuition.

In light of the characterizations presented in ancient Greek mythology, both Rand's and Keirsej's portraits of Apollo are somewhat askew. Apollo is identified variously as the god of prophecy, music, poetry, mathematics (he was believed to be the father of Pythagoras), medicine (his son Asclepius was the god of medicine), archery, light, the sun, streets and highways, colonization, order, justice, and legality, flocks and crops, plagues, and (perhaps) wolves and mice.

There are only two likely items in the preceding list that might justify attributing "god of reason" to Apollo. One is his sponsorship of music by the lyre and the kithara, which was very well-ordered (and thus "rational") compared to the more unruly, ecstatic rhythms of the aulos and drums in the music nurtured by Dionysus. The other is in his tendency to break up fights and to punish wrong-doers, as well as to refrain from joining in the frivolous fighting that his father Zeus fomented, as reported in the *Iliad*.

To the ancient Greeks, though, Apollo was not primarily regarded as a "god of reason." In fact, he was just as much a patron of the arts as he was of the sciences. To see this, one need only look at the array of subjects attached to his wards, the Muses: epic poetry, history, mime, the flute, light verse and dance, lyric choral poetry, tragedy, comedy, and astronomy. Such a disparate nonet defies a simple, unitary explanation in terms of the interests of a "god of reason."²⁶

In light of Apollo's sponsorship of the Muses for subjects like astronomy and mathematics, he can arguably be seen as pro-thinking and pro-reason, at least in some respects. Yet, Keirsej's view implies that Apollo, in symbolizing feeling plus intuition, was, if not *anti-rational*, at least *non-rational*.

On the other hand, in light of Apollo's sponsorship of the Muses for subjects like music and poetry, he should perhaps instead be seen as pro-feeling and pro-intuition. However, Rand's view implies that Apollo, in symbolizing reason, was against both the Dionysian anti-rational focus on feelings and the apparently Apollonian anti-rational reliance on mystic intuition (the basis of prophecy and divination,

Apollo's watchword).

What emerges from this clash of perspectives on Apollo is the realization (or suspicion, at least) that a false dichotomy is being invoked in order to characterize him as either (with Rand and Rand's version of Nietzsche) a god of reason or (with Keirsey) a god of feeling. Indeed, as Arrowsmith (1978) writes:

Apollo . . . is not simply a god of reason. Not unless one possesses, as the Greeks did, a sense of reason so ample that discursive logic, lyric poetry, music, and prophecy—but above all, prophecy—are, all of them, wholly rational activities, i.e., activities of the whole mind, *thought literally infused with feeling*. (x; emphasis added)

Although there are also problems in how Keirsey views Prometheus as exclusively concerned with *thinking* and intuition, the best place to start in sorting out and correcting both Keirsey's and Rand's errors is with Apollo. In effect, we must build a new characterization of Apollo, somewhat similar to, but different in critical ways from, the perspectives of both Rand and Keirsey—and more akin, actually, to the perspective of Nietzsche.

Some Germane Points about Apollo et al.

Aiding in this reconstruction of the Apollonian archetype are the insights provided by Janet Germane, a writer and lecturer in Myers-Briggs personality theory. While Jung ([1921] 1971) is at least partially on the right track, attaching Apollo neither to reason nor to emotion, he sees Apollo as being an *introverted* intuitive type, in contrast to Dionysus as an extraverted sensing type (143–44). Germane, however, has a somewhat different conception of the intuitive nature of Apollo, one which moreover allows her to reframe our view of Prometheus, as well.

Like Jung, Germane lays less stress on the reason-emotion issue than do Rand or Keirsey, but she goes beyond this. She suggests that a key facet of the essence of not just Apollo, but also Prometheus is *intuition*—moreover, two distinctly different kinds of intuition. Germane deliberately develops this view as an extended parallel to the way that Keirsey insightfully contrasts Dionysius and Epimetheus as

being characterized by two distinctly different kinds of sensing. As Keirsey does with sensing in regard to Dionysus and Epimetheus, Germane treats intuition as the primary aspect of Prometheus and Apollo, with reason and emotion being relatively more in the background as secondary concerns.

Keirsey and Germane, though holding different theoretical premises about personality and temperament, both rely on the basic personality concepts originated by Carl Jung and developed further by Meyers and Briggs (especially in the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator). But Jung further explained how people all have a preference not only for either sensing or intuition, but also for using that preference in an extraverted attitude or an introverted attitude. Keirsey did not accept Jung's perspective on this, instead interpreting the preferences for sensing and intuition in terms of behaviors rather than mental functions.²⁷

Germane's innovation, facilitated by her thinking within the Jungian functional framework, was to see a parallel between Epimetheus and Prometheus on the one hand, and Dionysus and Apollo on the other. Rather than Prometheus being an intuitive-thinking type, as Keirsey speculates, Germane sees him as an *introverted intuitive* type, in parallel to the introverted sensing type of his more concretely focused brother, Epimetheus. And instead of following Keirsey's view that Apollo is an intuitive-feeling type, or even Jung's view that Apollo is an introverted intuitive type, Germane sees him as an *extraverted intuitive* type, in parallel to the extraverted sensing type of Apollo's earthier, but no more experience-driven half-brother, Dionysus.

Germane adapts Keirsey's rather colorful device (1978, 41–42) for distinguishing between the extraverted sensing and the introverted sensing types, and applies it in parallel to the extraverted intuitive types and introverted intuitive types. The extraverted sensing and intuiting types, i.e., both Dionysus and Apollo, Germane says, are fun-loving “grasshoppers,” interested more in pleasurable or ecstatic experience and spontaneity and following one's impulses or inspirations. Similarly, she sees both the introverted sensing and intuiting types, Epimetheus and Prometheus, as hard-working “ants,” more concerned with stability and order—and with cleaving to one's responsibilities, whether to tradition or to progress.

There is good evidence for Germane's model, both from the character portraits in mythology of the four respective gods/demi-gods, and from their respective genealogies. The general characters of both Prometheus and Epimetheus show a strong focus on serious, conscientious, "ant" behavior, acting as pillars of responsibility toward their fellow human beings. As such, it should be no surprise that one of their brothers was none other than Atlas, who held the world on his shoulders . . . literally! (As Rand's version of the myth goes.)

In stark contrast to this, although Apollo and Dionysus were only half-brothers, it is clear that they both came from the same, rather reckless, self-absorbed, irresponsible father, the mighty Zeus. They both turned less toward the buttoned-down, socially responsible pursuits of Epimetheus and Prometheus, and more toward "grasshopper" behavior and pleasurable experience, whether the sensory Dionysian ecstasy of frolics and orgiastic activities or the more cerebral Apollonian ecstasy of poetry, music, history, and the like.

Indeed, we note that Nietzsche himself recognized this fundamental experiential passion in Apollonians:

If we could imagine dissonance become man—and what else is man?—this dissonance, to be able to live, would need a splendid illusion that would cover dissonance with a veil of beauty. *This is the true artistic aim of Apollo in whose name we comprehend all those countless illusions of the beauty of mere appearance that at every moment make life worth living at all and prompt the desire to live on in order to experience the next moment.* (143; emphasis added)

So, according to Nietzsche, man has a survival need to deliberately create beautiful illusions with which to cover or disguise the dissonance in life, and Apollo's "true artistic aim" is to provide such experiences that "at every moment make life worth living at all and prompt the desire to live on in order to experience the next moment."

This is hardly Rand's view of Apollo or of art. Indeed, she might well regard such a view as irrational. More importantly, it hardly serves to portray Apollo as quintessentially rational, but instead as more centrally concerned with experiential enjoyment—specifically, with the pursuit of artistic and scientific happiness.

As Germane (1987) expresses the matter:

The *most* intense experiences of both [Dionysians] and [Apollonians] will represent ecstatic states, characterized by complete faith in, and reliance on, process. At this *intense* end of the spectrum of experience, people use words that suggest merging of boundaries. [Both Dionysians and Apollonians] speak of being “lost in the flow” either (1) [Dionysians] through identification with highly focused physical activity (“getting high” on skiing, the Zen of archery or tennis, “centering” through pottery-making, use of Tantric traditions of sexuality, competitive sports), or (2) [Apollonians] through intimate, flowing connection in the more abstract mode (receptive openness, the “blissed-out” experience, the work of healing meditation, the rush of mental creativity, worship through song or silence, a sense of unity). Though these experiences are apparently very different in kind and quality, they are similar in their centering effect, showing the parallel of instinct and spirit. (69)

In less colloquial terms, to borrow from Keirse, the Dionysians are Artisans—and now, following Germane, we see that the Apollonians are, in a very general way, very much like the Dionysians in their pursuit of experiential ecstasy, only on a more abstract or spiritual plane. The fact, already noted, that Apollo was well known to have been the sponsor of the nine Muses, who presided over not just a number of the arts, but also mathematics and astronomy, points to an appropriate parallel label we might apply to the Apollonians: the “Muse-Seeker.”

Clearly, the Apollonian orientation is not just an abstract-level focus on emotion or feeling, as Keirse suggests, but on creative discovery in various different realms, which is reached by following one’s muse, as it were.²⁸ For this reason, I have coined the term “Muse-Seeker,” which I think well captures the spirit of Apollo as the pursuit not of one’s physical or sensuous impulses (as do the Dionysians), but, on the parallel, abstract plane of experience, of one’s spiritual, aesthetic, and intellectual inspirations.

God of Intuition!

The essence of the Apollonian temperament, in our view, is thus neither reason (thinking) nor emotion (feeling), but *intuition*. Furthermore, it is not intuition in general, but specifically *extraverted intuition*, the kind of intuition that looks out at the world and finds inspiration in nature and human society and creates a coherent inner model, whether harmonious or logical.²⁹ Extraverted intuition is a process of exploring the world, seeing possible connections, and exercising creative invention, whether artistic or theoretical, on what one encounters.

As Lowen (1982) explains, extraverted intuition is the “intellectual capacity to connect two apparently unconnected things . . . that might not normally be thought of as belonging together. . . . It is the key capacity for building more complex constructs and ideas from simpler ones” (82–83). The output from such combining processes may be a harmoniously fitting, emotionally pleasing result of working with an array of materials, as in music and poetry—or it may be a discovered “regularity that explains a particular sequence of events . . . some internally imagined pattern that unifies the occurrence of certain possibilities” in an array of data, as in scientific theorizing (109).

The Prometheans, on the other hand, derive some sort of inner inspiration or vision (introverted intuition) and find a way to implement this vision in the world, either as a form of scientific-technological advancement or as a form of humanistic-societal improvement. This suggests that Promethean temperament is characterized by *introverted intuition*, coupled with one of their judging functions, either thinking or feeling, in dealing with the world.³⁰ Introverted intuition is a process of turning inward to one’s store of ideas, seeking a deeper understanding of the nature or causal basis of those ideas, and then examining and evaluating how well those ideas are presently instantiated in the world.

In contrast to the Apollonian exercise of extraverted intuition, which stresses theoretical or artistic breadth, the Promethean use of introverted intuition emphasizes conceptual or abstract depth or hierarchy. Apollonian extraverted intuition places a premium on coherence or “horizontal” integration, on finding a conceptual or artistic integration of data or ideas—while Promethean introverted intuition strives most strongly for correspondence to reality or

“vertical” integration, on justifying one’s conceptual or artistic integrations. (It’s no surprise that analysts and critics are more often Prometheans than Apollonians.)

For instance, a process of extraverted intuition is what yields the realization that the regularity of a pendulum’s swing and the arc of a projectile’s motion both display certain regular patterns, while a process of introverted intuition is what yields the realization that both kinds of motion are governed by the same underlying causal principle. In this respect, Galileo and Kepler were more Apollonian, while Newton was more Promethean.

Viewed from this perspective, Keirsey’s temperament model has the Intuitive types askew, and does not have the types correctly assigned to the temperaments. His view is that intuitive-thinking is Promethean, while intuitive-feeling is Apollonian.³¹

However, as Germane notes, there is a strong parallel between the sensing and intuitive temperaments that Keirsey overlooked. First, Epimetheus was the Conservator of Culture, a more concrete-level, responsible, order-focused person, and his brother Prometheus was the Originator of Culture, a more abstract-level, responsible, order-focused person. Thus, if Keirsey is correct, as Germane concurs, that Epimetheus was the introverted-sensing demi-god,³² then most logically Prometheus should be regarded as the introverted-intuitive demi-god.³³

Secondly, Dionysus, with his godly promotion of more concrete-level crafts and sports, the extraverted-sensing god, had many parallels to Apollo, who was patron god of the Muses, presiding over more abstract pursuits (the arts and sciences). Again, if Keirsey is correct—and again, Germane concurs—that Dionysus was the extraverted-sensing god, then most logically Apollo should be recognized as the extraverted-intuitive god.³⁴

Apollo has been done a disservice by the long-lived tug-of-war between the partisans of the reason-emotion dichotomy. Apollo is not, as Rand claims, the god of reason, guiding us in the preserving or building or mastering of nature. Nor is he, as Keirsey claims, the god of intuitive-feeling, guiding us in the empathic, benevolent, diplomatic nurturing of mankind.

Instead, Apollo is all about understanding and exploring and discovering what makes the human race and the universe tick. He is

the quintessential hunter-gatherer of the spirit, i.e., of Truth and Goodness and Beauty. As a consequence, the person of Apollonian temperament embraces either reason *or* emotion, as appropriate, in his quest to seek and nurture his muse. His god, Apollo, is the god of extraverted intuition. This is the real Apollo.

Notes

1. See especially Rand 1961b, 21–23.

2. Joint exhaustiveness pertains to the sub-grouped species of a genus or other conceptual domain jointly exhausting the totality of members of the genus (or domain), and mutual exclusivity pertains to the sub-grouped species of a genus (or members of a domain) not having any overlap in the genus (or domain) members they contain.

3. In lecture two of his course “Introduction to Logic,” Peikoff (1974) discusses the fallacy of false alternative, which he defines as the failure to distinguish choices by the crucial act of specifying all relevant possibilities. He says that if an alternative is a form of the Law of the Excluded Middle, it is a true alternative; if not, it is a false alternative. He points out a number of false alternatives exposed by Objectivism and also referred to repeatedly by Objectivist writers as “false dichotomies,” such as reason vs. emotion, mind vs. body, communist vs. fascist, egoism vs. altruism, free will vs. causality. In lecture 1 of his “DIM Hypothesis” course, Peikoff (2004) discusses not dichotomies, but “trichotomies.” Reading between the lines of this relevant passage, however, it’s clear that he regards dichotomies and false alternatives as very closely related: “[P]roperly and fundamentally, we think of every issue as: it’s true, or it’s not true. That’s the Law of the Excluded Middle. It is, or it isn’t. That is the fundamental alternative on every issue. . . . A trichotomy means: three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities within a given field or question.” From these examples, it’s clear that the terms “false dichotomy” and “false alternative” refer correlatively to the same kind of situation: one in which one has incorrectly claimed a fundamental (mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive) opposition between two things. The false dichotomy is the incorrectly claimed fundamental opposition between the two things, and the false alternative is one of the two things incorrectly claimed to be fundamentally opposed. It follows from this that there can be *true* dichotomies and *true* alternatives as well.

4. Strictly speaking, “false” applies only to propositions, and a dichotomy is a specific kind of conceptual division, not a proposition. So, literally, “false dichotomy” is a contradiction in terms, meaning simply: non-dichotomy—and “true dichotomy” is a redundancy, meaning simply: dichotomy. But there is no problem in using the terms to refer to true and false claims using dichotomies and non-dichotomies as though they *were* dichotomies, as long as this is understood. If a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive conceptual division is restated as a proposition, it is then *strictly* correct to evaluate the division as “true” or “false.” For instance, it would be false to state that reason and emotion are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities of human guidance, because another option is irrationality. In other words, reason and emotion are A and B, not A and non-A.

This then is a false *statement* of a dichotomy, a false statement alleging that a non-dichotomy is actually a dichotomy—a “false dichotomy statement,” as it were. However, it would be *true* to state that reason and *irrational* emotion are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities of human guidance, because reason includes consequent rational emotions, and irrationality includes consequent irrational emotions, and *that is* a pair of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities—a real A or not-A alternative. This is a *true* statement of a dichotomy, a true statement identifying a real dichotomy.

5. For instance, see the analysis in Sciabarra 2000 (149–53) of monism vs. dualism and atomism vs. organicism, two false dichotomies that frequently arise in discussions of metaphysics and methodology. Also, there is the perennial, pervasive false dichotomy of intrinsic vs. subjective. As Kelley writes in the Introduction to his book, *The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand*: “Intrinsicism is characteristic of religious and authoritarian movements; subjectivism has been the hallmark of secular, relativist thought. . . . Ayn Rand . . . saw the clash [between them] as a false dichotomy. . . . Fundamentally, the choice is objectivity versus non-objectivity, in its various forms” (14). While intrinsicism and subjectivism *are* mutually exclusive and *do* clash with one another, they are *not* jointly exhaustive of the possibilities for a relationship between existence and consciousness. And as Kelley further correctly notes, objectivity (i.e., adherence to reality) and non-objectivity (i.e., non-adherence to reality, which includes intrinsicism and subjectivism) are mutually exclusive *and* jointly exhaustive *and* in fundamental conflict with one another. Intrinsicism vs. subjectivism is thus a false dichotomy, and objectivity vs. non-objectivity is a true dichotomy. (Again, more precisely, intrinsicism vs. subjectivism is an opposition falsely asserted to be a dichotomy; objectivity vs. non-objectivity truly asserted to be one.) See Bissell 2007 for a logical validation of Rand’s intrinsic-objective-subjective trichotomy by means of the conjoining of two true dichotomies.

6. Take concept A = “that aspect of the psyche which rules human thought and action.” Then B = reason and not-B = not reason are the two factors of the psyche that rule human thought and action. The reason-emotion dichotomy is basically trying to claim that emotion is not-B, i.e., not-reason. But this is a package deal. Irrational emotions are the product of not-reason, while rational emotions are the product of reason. So really B = reason and the emotions it generates (the rational ones), and not-B = not-reason and the emotions it generates (the irrational ones). That is the real dichotomy involving reason and emotions, not the oversimplified, historical package-deal. As Rand restated it for simplicity and clarity: reason vs. irrational emotions. For an illuminating overview of the development of the Objectivist view of the nature of and relationship between reason and emotion, see Sciabarra 1995, 180–89, 195–98. He writes: “. . . Objectivism rejects the principle of an essential antagonism between reason and emotion. Any conflict between these two spheres reveals a contradiction between two principles—one articulated, the other tacit and subconscious—that has manifested as an emotional response” (185).

7. By “endorsed,” I simply mean that Rand advocated it as the best way to conceptually grasp and label the “fundamental conflict of our age,” and “Apollo vs. Dionysus” as the best way to symbolically represent it.

8. It might be questioned whether every irrational thought breeds an irrational

emotion—otherwise reason and irrational emotion would not be jointly exhaustive. The answer is that, by definition, that's what an irrational emotion is: the product of an irrational thought, just as a rational emotion is the product of a rational thought.

9. Again, a real dichotomy names things that are in *necessary* conflict, so there *can't* be a "reconciliation" or "conflict resolution" of the two sides of a real dichotomy. For instance, as long as a person continues to think both rational thoughts and irrational thoughts, i.e., as long as he is going to try to hold contradictory ideas in his mind, he is going to experience both rational emotions and irrational emotions—and he is *not* going to be able to resolve the conflict between the rational thoughts and the irrational emotions. He cannot reconcile the irrational *emotions* with the rational thoughts, any more than he can reconcile the irrational *thoughts* with the rational thoughts. There is no reconciliation *possible*, for they are contradictory. There is no truce or peaceful coexistence possible. If he eradicates his irrational thoughts, the irrational emotions will fade away and disappear. But that is not "reconciliation," but *extermination!* Suppose we were to eschew use of both "dichotomy" and "conflict" in referring to the reason vs. irrational emotion opposition. How would that be clearer or more precise? Rand herself referred to "reason vs. emotion" as an "alleged dichotomy," which necessarily implies that she viewed her own distinction of "reason vs. irrational emotion" as a *real* dichotomy. And she called it "the fundamental conflict of our age." To avoid such wordage and conclusions would seem to be *retreating* from her level of clarity and insight, not emulating it!

10. It should be pointed out that Rand (1957) referred to Atlas as having not the sky, but the "world" on his shoulders (422). Actually, it was Heracles who shrugged off (actually, as an anonymous reader pointed out, tricked Atlas into reassuming) the task of holding up the sky when Atlas refused to reassume it after obtaining the golden apples for Heracles. Perhaps Rand instead should have named her novel *Heracles Shrugged* or used the original working title of the novel, *The Strike*.

11. See especially Rand 1961a, in which, following the inspired formulation of Nathaniel Branden, she characterizes Attila as the paradigm of the "mystic of the muscle" and the Witch doctor as the quintessential "mystic of the mind" (14).

12. Nietzsche, in turn, derived his view from Schopenhauer. As Kaufmann (1967) writes: "In *The Birth* the contrast between the Dionysian and Apollinian [sic] is indebted to Schopenhauer's contrast between will and representation" (506).

13. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this identification.

14. It should be noted, however, that there was a particularly intense wave of Apollonian Hellenism that swept through Germany and England beginning about 1750. This may actually be the cultural wellspring of the modern Classical movement and, in particular, the modern identification of Apollo with reason. Keefe 1987 notes that, unlike Nietzsche (and Rand), some intellectuals were, by the late 1800s, moving away from the "blithe oversimplifications" of this perspective (157). He cites British author Walter Pater's eschewing of a "sanitized Apollonianism" and portraying Apollo as instead being "as dualistic as his . . . antagonist, Dionysus" (168). Pater's approach is similar in some respects to this essay's proffered alternative to the standard view of Apollo.

15. See especially Rand 1969, 103–6. Also, see Rand 1957, in which her main

hero, John Galt, states: “An emotion that clashes with your reason, an emotion that you cannot explain or control, is only the carcass of that stale thinking which you forbade your mind to revise” (151). Clearly, Rand sees supposed reason-emotion clashes as being, fundamentally, reason-reason, viz., present thinking-past thinking clashes.

16. While a much larger array of characteristics attributed to Apollo could readily be assembled, I honestly doubt that Rand would have named something other than “reason,” had she pored over them and been asked to summarize in a single attribute the fundamental nature of Apollo. From her perspective, Apollo was the “good guy” in Western culture, and if his antithesis, Dionysus, is the embodiment of irrational emotions, then Apollo *has* to be the epitome of reason, and if reason is included among or implied by one or more of the features listed by Nietzsche, so much the better. I argue here that her conclusion was incorrect, though it was a reasonable error. I personally think that it is necessary to supplement the process of extracting a fundamental characteristic from a list of attributes by carefully perusing the *historical-mythological context* in which those attributes are found. If one does so, I maintain, it becomes apparent that reason is *not* Apollo’s most basic attribute.

17. Also, as a consequence, although Rand is correct that the Apollo Moon Project was aptly named, it is not because of its symbolization of reason per se, as I argue in Note 34.

18. Keirsey’s son-in-law, Stephen Montgomery, has followed in this vein, penning a yet-incomplete series “The Pygmalion Project: Love and Coercion among the Types.” Volume One, *The Artisan*, and Volume Three, *The Idealist*, are of particular relevance to the present concern.

19. The first three dimensions are nearly self-explanatory, though helpful information and definitions can be found in the various works by Keirsey and Myers cited herein.

20. Although Objectivists in general take a rather dim view of intuition, because of the frequently anti-rational claims about its nature, Barbara Branden (1969, lecture 3) regards it simply as the result of “subconscious integrations” of one’s observations of facts. See also Note 28 below.

21. See Myers 1980, 8–9.

22. See Myers-McCaulley 1985, 14.

23. Keirsey cites various Rand characters as examples of intuitive-thinking temperament, as does his son-in-law, Stephen Montgomery in his Pygmalion Project books. Montgomery specifically cites three characters from *Atlas Shrugged* as being Rational-Prometheans: Hank Rearden, John Galt, and Dagny Taggart, and he has twice announced that he will give special attention to Galt and Dagny in his yet-unpublished fourth volume, *The Rationals*.

24. Thus, Keirsey’s understanding of the Apollo-type is roughly similar to Nietzsche’s portrayal of Apollo, although Nietzsche’s Apollo is not partisan to feeling and emotion as Keirsey’s is.

25. See especially Keirsey-Bates 1978, who claim that by virtue of their “living only for immediate action,” the Dionysian, sensing-perceiving types become “the world’s great performing artists: the virtuosos of art, entertainment, and adventure. The great painters, instrumentalists, vocalists, dancers, sculptors, photographers, athletes, hunters, racers, gamblers—all need the skills which come only from excited

concentration on an activity for long periods” (35–36).

26. Athena, by contrast, was explicitly identified as the goddess of reason and intelligence, as well as the city, agriculture, handicrafts, arts and literature, and she is credited with numerous inventions, including the bridle, the pot, the flute, the trumpet, the rake, the plow, the ship, the chariot, and the yoke. See <<http://www.greekmythology.com/Olympians/Athena/athena.html>>. It has also been noted that the current St. Peter’s Cathedral in Rome features “Minerva (Goddess of Reason) on the side of rational thinkers, and Apollo (God of Poetry) on side of inspirational thinkers.” See <<http://www.geocities.com/r17bb/SchAthens.html>>. Unless it were somehow argued that “reason” is a broader concept than “rational thinking,” and that it subsumes both “rational thinking” and “inspirational thinking” (and poetry), it would seem that, yet again, we have a clear sign that Western civilization regarded the Apollonian as being, if not completely irrational, at least not essentially rational.

27. Thus, Keirsey would speak of Dionysians as being “sensing-perceiving” types, but he would avoid the equivalent expression “extraverted-sensing.” From the Jungian functional standpoint, however, there is no problem with either way of referring to Dionysians, since they both mean that a Dionysian prefers to use sensing (rather than intuition) and to use it in dealing with the external world (rather than reflectively).

28. One’s “muse,” as I understand it, is simply one’s fascination with forming assorted spontaneous, creative inspirations and hunches—in other words, for engaging in a process of *intuition*—in some area of one’s interest. Intuition is sometimes given more of a mystic and/or emotional characterization, but, as Barbara Branden observes (1969, lecture 3), it is not “some sort of mystic visitation,” but simply a more abstract form of immediate awareness, fueled by subconscious connections. Nor is it any more emotional in essence than is sensing (i.e., perception). The emotional element often associated with intuition actually comes in at the subsequent step, when one’s reflection on a hunch results in a feeling of certainty that something is the case—a state, as Branden characterizes it, of “feeling strongly, without conscious evidence or grounds, that a certain fact is true,” based on “the subconscious integrations that occur, as a result of [one’s] observations [of facts].”

29. Therefore, since the Apollonians prefer to use one of their perceiving functions, viz., intuition, in dealing with the external world, we can by Jungian convention refer to them as intuitive-perceiving types—or, equivalently, as “extraverted intuitive” types, whose outwardly directed intuition is paired by some with introverted thinking and by others with introverted feeling. (A given function preference is paired, according to Jungian theory, with one of the opposite attitude and orientation. E.g., a person preferring one of the perceiving functions, such as intuition, in the extraverted attitude will also prefer one of the judging functions in the introverted attitude.)

30. They are thus alternatively labeled Intuitive-Judging types.

31. However, based on Germane’s reasoning, the Promethean temperament is better described in Keirseyan terms as intuitive-*judging*, while the Apollonian temperament is more accurately seen as intuitive-*perceiving*.

32. Or, as Keirsey calls him, sensing-judging.

33. Or, as Keirsej might call him, intuitive-judging. Both Epimetheus and Prometheus, each in their own way, were “pillars of society,” so to speak, so it’s not an accident that their brother was <sound the trumpets!> none other than *Atlas!*

34. As a consequence, I think that Project Apollo was very well named, even though I see no obvious grounds for crediting Apollo with the massively complex web of acts of reason necessary to implement the project. All of that scientific and technological wizardry was much more in the mold of the Promethean fire-bringer, bent to the task of mastering the universe. No, instead, it is the Muse-Seeking pursuit of inspirations, the quest for answers, the challenging of the unknown, that are all very much in the spirit of “Star Trek”: to “boldly go where no man has gone,” and which is also the animating spirit of Project Apollo. And that is essential not to reason, but to outward-directed intuition, to Apollonian extraverted intuition.

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